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ABSTRACT 
The Marine Corps contracting community continually refines its policies and 
procedures as a response to the changing environment it operates in. The objective of this 
thesis was to develop a permanent contracting command structure in order to maximize 
the training, education and potential of the military contracting officers. To accomplish 
this objective, this thesis identified the historical and statutory basis for government 
contracting, where billets for qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers exist 
and where they are currently non-existent yet in demand, and the roles and 
responsibilities of the Marine Corps military contracting officers. Based upon this 
archival research and interviews with members of the contracting community, this thesis 
developed a framework for a new permanent contracting command structure through the 
use of an integrated systems model. This model assists in creating more military 
contracting officer billets, standardizes the reporting and operational chains of command, 
promotes stability, growth and development, aids in boosting retention, and creates a path 
for career progression. This study is a proactive approach to the changing environment of 
contracting that will better prepare the contracting community to support the operational 
forces and lead the Marine Corps through the 21 51 century. 
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The Marine Corps faces new challenges in executing its mission through the 21st 
century. Today's enemy is smaller, smarter and more technologically advanced. More 
and more we see the United States Marine Corps (USMC) performing humanitarian 
operations, non-combatant evacuations, operations other than war and low intensity 
conflicts, as well as the daily garrison duties with a downsized force. As each 
contingency arises, the need for swift and effective support operations becomes a vital 
element to ensure success. 
A key component to the support operations is contracting. From the serene base 
operations support contracting to the bullet riddled battlefields of Bosnia in contingency 
contracting, the war fighters have needs that cannot be met through the traditional Marine 
Corps supply system. This is where Marine Corps contracting takes over. Today there 
are only twenty billets available and filled by qualified military contracting officers. 
These billets are geographically dispersed throughout the world and each operates 
differently; from what they do to whom they report to. Generally speaking, these 
officers' origins and training are the same, but upon leaving their schooling and returning 
to the operational forces to support the war fighters, each embarks on a substantially 
different path. 
Marine officers spend time in the operational forces in their primary Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) and then, if selected, attend the Naval Postgraduate 
School for training and education in Acquisitions and Contract Management. 
Immediately following graduation, the officers are then sent out to one of the twenty 
billets mentioned earlier to do a payback tour as a contracting officer for three years. 
When that tour expires, each officer then returns to their primary MOS field in the 
operational forces. After leaving the contracting payback tour, there is virtually no more 
association and active participation in the contracting operations of the Marine Corps. 
The Marine Corps spends tens of thousands of dollars on each officer who attends 
the Naval Postgraduate School. One study suggests that the cost per student attending the 
Naval Postgraduate School exceeds $109,000 [Ref. 1:p. 14]. The officer spends eighteen 
months going through a grueling academic curriculum in obtaining his Master's degree 
and becoming a qualified contracting officer. This commitment by both the Marine 
Corps and the officer should have more of a longstanding impact on the service. In the 
Army, for example, once you make the transition to the contracting field, you remain in 
there for the duration of your time in the service. This study will look at that possibility 
for the Marine Corps and try to develop through the use of an organizational systems 
model a similar permanent command structure. The objective will be to show where 
additional billets could be created in the Marine Corps and at other joint commands for 
qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers. The net gain will be a better 
contracting force that is trained, equipped and ready to support the Marine Corps as it 
leads the way through the 21st century. 
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B. OBJECTIVE 
The primary purpose of this research is to review the current policies and 
organizational structure of the United States Marine Corps military contracting officer 
force; then to analyze the current design's strengths and weaknesses and develop a model 
for a new permanent contracting command structure that will be better prepared to meet 
today's operational needs and support the forces through the 2P1 century. Following the 
analysis of the data from interviews and a literature review, the researcher intends to use a 
systems model to develop a proposed new command structure for the United States 
Marine Corps' organizational design that will aid military contracting officers in more 
effectively carrying out their assigned missions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research question will be used to direct and guide the 
objectives of this study: 
How can the United States Marine Corps re-structure its military officer 
contracting force to be better prepared to meet today's needs and be more 
effective in supporting the operational forces? 
In order to find a complete answer to this primary research question, some other 
areas must be reviewed and fully understood. To do so, the following secondary 
questions will be used in this study: 
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1. Where do the current billets exist for Marine Corps military contracting 
officers and where are billets currently non-existent that if created would 
benefit the Marine Corps in supporting its operational needs? 
2. What are the current roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps military 
contracting officers at each command? 
3. How does the USMC support the Defense Contracting Management Agency 
(DCMA) with qualified military contracting officers and can additional billets 
be provided that would benefit both DCMA and the Marine Corps? 
4. What lessons can the USMC learn from the US Army in their effective and 
efficient training and employment of their military contracting officer 
personnel? 
5. What organizational design changes can be made in the USMC to 
continuously provide for well trained contracting officers that are mission 
effective and what is the resulting career field path? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this thesis will include a review of the policies on the training, 
educating and assigning of military officers in the USMC contracting field. This will 
help to understand the "how, when, where and why's" regarding the nature of the Marine 
Corps military contracting officer force. A review of the design and structure of the 
billets for Marine Corps military contracting officers will show where the current military 
contracting officer billets are available and the purpose they serve. Next, an in-depth 
analysis of the current command structure of the Marine Corps military contracting 
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officer billets and the roles and responsibilities of the officers assigned to them will be 
investigated. This will show the current structure's strengths and weaknesses to help lead 
to recommended solutions to improve efficiency and effectiveness throughout. Lastly, 
the thesis will develop a systems model that integrates the Marine Corps contracting 
campaign and that will aid in determining how to re-structure the military officer 
contracting force in order to be better prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 
This research will be based upon the experiences of past, current and future 
military officers in the contracting field that have supported normal day-to-day 
operational needs as well as contingency operations. The methodology used in this 
thesis research will be multifaceted. To begin with, the researcher will conduct a 
literature review of books, magazine articles, studies, journals, policies, Marine Corps 
Orders and Directives, Marine Corps doctrines and other information resources that deal 
with the subject of Marine Corps contracting. From there the researcher will conduct 
interviews with past, current and future Marine Corps contracting officers to gain a sense 
of their roles and responsibilities in performing their day-to-day missions and 
contingency operations. This will help the reader to gain a sense of exactly what a 
USMC military contracting officer does in the performance of his duties. Next, 
interviews will be conducted with Marine Corps Legal officers to gain a sense of their 
unique command and support structure. The investigation then turns to conducting 
interviews with officers assigned to the Army Acquisition Corps to gain a sense of their 
roles and responsibilities and determine if the Marine Corps could benefit from a similar 
command concept. The latter two actions are the driving elements to aid in designing a 
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systems design change that will mirror the concept of the Army Acquisition Corps yet 
possess the physical structure of a Marine Corps legal command. To push the 
investigation further, the researcher will conduct interviews with officers assigned to the 
Defense Contract Management Agency to gain a sense of their roles and responsibilities 
and determine if Marine Corps military contracting officers would benefit by being 
assigned to that command. This would be a step in working towards more ')oint" 
military operations on a daily basis and not just in hostile/war time situations. 
The Marine Corps spends a lot of time and money on training, educating and 
employing its military contracting officers. In doing so, the individual Marine officer 
spends a considerable amount of time outside of his primary Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS). When he returns to that primary MOS field after his single payback 
tour in contracting, he is not attuned to current practices in his MOS field. After catching 
back up with that MOS field and being away from the contracting spectrum, the officer 
then loses his edge in the contracting field and generally never assumes another 
contracting assignment in the Marine Corps. These are significant tradeoffs in both 
situations. By integrating a systems design model with this study, a new organizational 
structure for a permanent Marine Corps contracting command can be developed. This 
would have the officer make the transition to the contracting field and serve in that 
MOS/field for the remainder of his time in the Marine Corps. The development of a 
systems model that integrates the USMC contracting campaign and that will aid in 
determining how to re-structure the contracting force in order to be better prepared to 
meet the challenges of the 21st century is the goal. As the investigation looks for trends 
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or key elements that will show that the Marine Corps and the individual contracting 
officer will benefit from a system design change, the results of this study could then be 
proposed to key senior officers in leadership roles of the Marine Corps to evaluate and 
execute as deemed appropriate. 
A few key assumptions were made in conducting this study. They deal primarily 
with the civilian and enlisted Marines of the Marine Corps contracting field. \Vhile both 
are of the utmost importance and essential elements of the Marine Corps contracting 
world, neither is being reviewed or analyzed in this study. The assumption in this study 
is that when the military contracting officer force is discussed that it also includes any 
required enlisted Marines and/or civil service employees normally supporting these 
officers in their commands. This would mean that any changes proposed would be 
accompanied by the appropriate complement of civilian and enlisted Marines normally 
present to support and assist the Marine Corps military contracting officers in carrying 
out their assigned missions. A specific change or modification to the civilian and/or 
enlisted Marine structure would be a complete study on its own. 
The second and final assumption is that the Marine Corps is willing to 
acknowledge its strengths and weaknesses and not be adverse to changing its structure to 
increase its effectiveness. As Marines in the occupational fields of supply, 
administration, fiscal, legal and food service are considered to be war fighters, so should 
the business leaders of the Marine Corps. This assumption acknowledges the USMC 
military contracting officers as such. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This research effort is comprised of six chapters covering the following subject 
areas: 
Chapter I is an introduction providing the rationale and objectives to be obtained 
in this study. 
Chapter II provides background information on the military contracting 
community within the Marine Corps. It also reviews the structure of this community as 
well as the Marine Corps legal commands, the Army Acquisition Corps, and the Defense 
Contract Management Agency. 
Chapter III will present the data collected by the researcher from key personnel in 
the above mentioned areas. It provides a realistic view of the duties actually being 
performed in the billets currently available and filled by qualified military contracting 
officers. 
Chapter IV will be an in-depth analysis of the data collected in Chapters II and III. 
It will cover the strengths, weaknesses, similarities, deficiencies, key elements and trends. 
Chapter V will take the material presented in Chapters II, III and IV and suggest a 
new command structure of a permanent contracting command through the use of an 
integrated systems model. 
Chapter VI will summarize the research effort and findings while providing 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND DATA 
Congressional control over the procurement system through laws, regulations and 
statutes has been in effect since the Revolutionary War. For over 150 years now, 
Congress has assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the procurement system and 
continues to find it cumbersome, inefficient and laden with deficiencies. [Ref. 2:p. 16] 
This chapter reviews historical and statutory information and then transitions to Marine 
Corps specific policies and procedures that govern the contracting community. 
A. COMMISSIONS AND CHANGE 
A considerable number of employees work in Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition organizations that execute millions of contract actions every year. The idea of 
change is not new to the Department of Defense Acquisition and Contracting world. 
There have been major commissions, numerous reports and acquisition improvement acts 
created to review the Department of Defense's acquisition process. One fact does stand 
out, that is, the importance of centralized policymaking and decentralized program 
execution. 
Since 1971, two key policy documents (known as the 5000 series documents) 
have been revised and reissued ten times with the eleventh revision possibly due out this 
year. When these documents were originally issued, they totaled seven pages. Through 
time, the documents have grown to over 900 pages in length. This serves as possible 
evidence that the Department of Defense is somewhat unclear about how it wants to 
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proceed. The evolution does reveal that the Department of Defense seems to be sensitive 
to changes in its environment and that it is willing to adapt its own procedures to respond 
as necessary. [Ref. 3:pp. 109-127] 
1. First Hoover Commission 
"Purchasing requires a high degree of professional competence, yet many 
purchasing offices are not manned with competent personnel" [Ref 4:p. 89]. The first 
Hoover Commission stated this as a major deficiency of federal supply operations. This 
commission was brought into being by the Lodge-Brown Act and created by a unanimous 
vote of the Congress in July of 1937. The Commission was tasked with organizing the 
Executive Branch to operate more effectively and efficiently. The Commission promoted 
the assumption that the Executive branch had never been effectively organized by 
continuously avoiding the term "reorganization". It sought to reduce duplication of 
efforts and overlapping of functions. The result was a blueprint for good government. 
To attack this mighty task, the Hoover Commission defined twenty-four principal 
problems of Government and management. It then created special research committees, 
known as "task forces" made up of specialists in key fields. It began to create a model of 
a streamlined government. One of the areas it dissected was federal supply operations, 
known today as "purchasing and contracting." The Commission concluded that supply, 
as it was called in that era, was not fully recognized as an important executive function. 
This failure was reflected in an inadequate supply organization for the 
government as a whole as well as for the various departments and agencies. Lastly it 
stated that: 
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This failure is reflected further in the personnel system which does not 
provide competent staff to fill supply positions. Although purchasing is a 
highly skilled profession that requires intimate knowledge of trade 
conditions and markets, Government agencies are inadequate to recruit 
and keep persons with the required professional competence, personnel 
processes fail to make proper acknowledgement of the skills required. 
[Ref. 4:p. 96] 
This was one of the earliest emphasis on improving the professionalism, 
effectiveness and stability of the contracting workforce. 
2. Second Hoover Commission 
In 1955, the second Hoover Commission dedicated an entire task force to review 
military procurement. In doing so, the task force was able to delve into greater detail 
pertaining to the subject then previously had been done. A wealth of talent and ability in 
the military departments was being partially utilized in the procurement world because of 
the following four reasons: 
1. Requiring those who achieve top military rank to become well 
rounded in all military fields, with predominant emphasis going to 
combat command skills; 
2. Rotating key logistics personnel from assignments prior to the 
arrival and indoctrination of qualified replacements; 
3. Assigning senior officers with limited logistics training to key 
logistics positions; and 
4. Depriving civilians of access to many key positions of 
predominantly business management character, on the grounds that 
such positions must be reserved for the training of military 
executives or that background in military operations is a 
prerequisite. [Ref. 5:p. 68] 
The Task Force also stated to the Commission, which reported out to the 
President of the United States, that it was not uncommon to find key 
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personnel/Commanding Officers/Officers-In-Charge at many of the largest logistical 
organizations to be inexperienced in the functions they were charged with managing. 
To remedy this, it was thought that a policy should be implemented that included 
~---~---~ -·· -
the following steps: 
1. Departmental school programs should be designed to assure the 
phased training of all career procurement employees not 
adequately qualified; 
2. The positions of material manager, Commanding Officer of a 
logistical unit, and all technical or supervisory positions at any 
non-tactical units should be filled only with qualified career-
trained personnel. Where it was necessary to place combat officers 
in logistical activities as staff assistants or advisors, each officer 
should be required to qualify through proper training and 
experience; and 
3. Qualified civilians should be given the logistical training made 
available to military personnel, and an opportunity to advance in 
those positions except where the requirement for military 
personnel is essential. [Ref. 5 :p. 69] 
The main thrusts from this commission concerning military procurement activities 
came in the form of two clear, bold and matter-of-fact recommendations that stated: 
1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense should establish Department of 
Defense policies to strengthen the role of contracting officers in the 
interest of more expeditious and effective buying; and 
2. The Secretary of Defense should establish a policy requiring each 
military department to develop and assign career-trained personnel 
to technical and executive posts throughout the field of 
procurement management. [Ref. 5:p. 67] 
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3. The Fitzhugh Commission 
More than 20 years after the first Hoover Commission reported its findings, the 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by President Nixon in July 1969. The 
Chairman of the Board for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Gilbert W. 
Fitzhugh, was called upon to be the Chair of this newly appointed Defense Panel. The 
other members of the panel included prominent members of the business and education 
communities, while omitting any elected Government officials. The Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel would later be known as the Fitzhugh Commission. As the Commission 
was directed to study the business organization and management of the Department of 
Defense, it was specifically tasked with reviewing "the Defense procurement policies and 
practices, particularly as they related to costs, time and quality". [Ref. 6:p. V] 
After reviewing prior reports of studies on the Department of Defense, 
interviewing hundreds of employees within the Department of Defense, surveying 
organizations within the Department of Defense, and consulting with reputable 
individuals outside of the Department of Defense, the results virtually mirrored those that 
the Hoover Commission uncovered two decades earlier: the system was broken and 
needed to be corrected in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. The 
commission specifically stated that: 
The promotion and rotation systems of the military services do not 
facilitate career development in the technical and professional activities 
such as research and development, procurement, intelligence, 
communications and automatic data processing. [Ref. 6:p. 2] 
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The report also contained specific observations of the Program Management field 
of which contracting is an integral part, in stating that: 
Program Management assignments have not generally been recognized as 
having good potential for career development for military officers. 
Program Management is not effectively a career service for military 
officers, although military officers act as Program Managers on a majority 
of developments, and are almost always designated as Program Managers 
for major systems. These officers have traditionally been rotated on 
normal tours of duty (2-4 years) among a variety of types of jobs. 
Although they usually bring to the Program Manager assignment 
knowledge of the operational use of the type of system involved in the 
development, they often have a minimum of training and experience in 
business management; yet they are faced with the task of negotiating with 
and monitoring the efforts of industrial organizations which bring to the 
problem talented, technical and management personnel with extensive 
continuity and experience in the particular type of activity encompassed in 
the development. In addition, Program Managers have been often rotated, 
based on time in their careers, at critical points in the development of the 
programs and frequently with no overlap for training their successor. 
[Ref. 6:p. 79] 
In voicing this need for better business practices, increased organizational stability 
and beneficial training and experience in the procurement field, the Commission reported 
to the President that the Department of Defense should establish a procurement career 
specialty code, a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), in each branch of the Service. 
Additionally, it specified that this new field should select, train and educate a sufficient 
number of qualified officers to carry out these business type missions for the good of the 
services and the Department of Defense as a whole. [Ref. 6:p. 8] 
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4. General Accounting Office Report: Recommendations on 
Government Procurement 
The Department of Defense procurement activities have been the subject of many 
General Accounting Office (GAO) reports. One particular GAO report of May 1979 
captured the state of the military contracting officer community asserting that: 
Agencies were appointing many contracting officers not qualified by 
experience or trammg. The Commission recognized that although 
procurement was not yet a profession, the increasing complexity and 
importance of the procurement process demand a more competent and 
professional workforce. [Ref. 7 :p. 16] 
The report repeatedly identified poor execution of reform initiatives, a continued 
lack of formal training in procurement and a military acquisition career field that was 
extremely limited. The GAO acknowledged the important structural changes proposed 
over the last decade but was deeply concerned because "the program is far from complete 
and momentum is slowing." With this, the GAO acclaimed, "renewed dedication in the 
Executive branch and Congressional action is needed". [Ref. 7:p. 1] 
5. The Packard Commission 
President Reagan appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management in July 1985. This Commission was chaired by former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense David Packard and was more commonly known as the Packard Commission. 
The Commission was established to: 
Study defense management policies and procedures, including the budget 
process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the 
organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, 
among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command System, the 
military departments and Congress. [Ref. 8:p. 42] 
The Commission identified numerous deficiencies in the procurement system that 
addressed inflexible acquisition procedures, burdensome regulations and laws, a lack of 
authority for the Program Managers to control programs, and the subjecting of acquisition 
personnel to never ending bureaucratic obligations for making reports. The Packard 
Commission took issue with the processes that the acquisition workforce had to work 
within and with Congress when they specifically stated: 
Chances for meaningful improvement will come not from mere regulation 
but only with major institutional change. Common sense must be made to 
prevail alike in the enactments of Congress and the operations of the 
Department. We must give acquisition personnel more authority to do 
their jobs. [Ref. 9:p. 13] 
The Commission recommended to President Reagan that he establish an 
unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy and clear ·accountability for 
acquisition execution along with the "establishment of business related education and 
experience criteria ... which will provide a basis for the professionalism of their career 
paths." [Ref. 9:p. 16] 
It also recommended: 
Statutory creation of an under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition at a 
level equivalent to that of the Deputy Secretary who would set overall 
policy for procurement, and research and development (R&D), and 
supervise the performance of the entire acquisition system to streamline 
the acquisition process and create an acquisition executive for each of the 
military departments and program executives for each major weapon 
program. [Ref. 8:p. 43] 
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6. The House Armed Services Committee Report (1990) 
For over forty years, studies had been conducted and reports had been issued 
pertaining to the deficiencies in the procurement community of the Department of 
Defense regarding its organization, policies and procedures. In 1990, Congress decided 
to conduct a review of these problems on its own and tasked the Housed Armed Services 
Committee with the execution of it. The purpose was to examine the organization, 
quality and professionalism of the acquisition workforce. The following excerpt from the 
final report summarizes this by stating: 
It is clear that there is no lack of statutory, Executive Order and outside 
expert identification of problems and recommended changes that should 
be pursued to improve the quality and professionalism of the acquisition 
workforce. Yet despite the obvious changes made in the recent past, few 
are convinced that enough has been done. New and varied proposals to 
change the organization or character of the acquisition workforce have 
been espoused with increasing efficiency. 
Before considering the adoption of any of these proposals, the Committee 
on Armed Services believed that it was crucial to conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the state of the acquisition workforce and any trends that may 
be evident. Without such an assessment, it is virtually impossible to 
determine cause and effect, hence to determine with any certainty that 
proposed solutions to this problem will bring about the desired result. 
Thus, the objective of this report is to assess the qualifications and 
professionalism of the acquisition workforce - both present and past, 
military and civilian; to review the efforts of the Department of Defense 
and the military departments to establish and manage the career 
development of the workforce; and where appropriate, provide 
recommendations for improving the quality and professionalism of that 
workforce. [Ref. 1 O:p. 65] 
As the Committee investigated the levels of education and experience of the 
procurement professionals, it became clear that the previous studies, reports and 
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Commissions were in fact correct and that major changes were needed to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement community. The next step was to enact a 
body of legislation that would promote such an organizational design change. [Ref. 11 :p. 
21] 
7. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
In November of 1990, Congress passed into law the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DA WIA) that addressed significant acquisition reform 
initiatives. The main thrust of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act was 
its direction to create, develop and professionalize an acquisition corps in the Department 
of Defense. Specifically it stated: 
The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies and procedures for the 
effective management (including accession, education, training, and career 
development) of persons serving in acquisition positions in the 
Department of Defense. [Ref. 12:p. 1639] 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act called for implementation 
of these new policies and procedures in a uniform manner within the Department of 
Defense and also for each of the military departments to form its own acquisition corps. 
It specifically stated, "A separate acquisition corps may be established for each of the 
Navy and the Marine Corps." [Ref. 13] 
The services were to designate those positions, or billets, that were acquisition 
positions in one of eleven areas. Contracting was listed as the third area of those eleven. 
A career development plan for military contracting officers that allowed for education, 
training, experience, and assignments necessary for career progression was directed. In 
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assigning these military contracting officers, it should be noted that there is a statement in 
the policy that discussed balancing the need "for sufficient time to provide the stability 
necessary to effectively carry out the duties of the position and to allow for the 
establishment of responsibility and accountability for actions taken in the position." 
Furthermore, it recommended that the military departments should provide, as 
appropriate, for longer lengths of assignments to acquisition (contracting) positions than 
assignments to other positions. [Ref. 14] 
After categorizing the positions and dividing them into three levels (Levels I, II 
and III respectively), the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act sets 
minimum standards for the purpose of professionalizing the acquisition corps. The 
standards were also divided into three categories as listed below: 
1. Education and training requirements. 
2. Military grade/rank requirements. 
3. Experience requirements. [Ref. 11 :pp. 23-26] 
The organizational design for the military procurement community was 
investigated and scrutinized for more than fifty years and now the change was truly 
beginning to evolve. It began to take the shape of centralized policy and decentralized 
execution. 
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B. MARINE CORPS POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNING 
MILITARY OFFICERS TO CONTRACTING OFFICER BILLETS 
After reviewing the historical data on the evolution of the organizational changes 
in the procurement community within the Department of Defense and military 
departments in general, this study now turns to investigating how the Marine Corps 
executes its procurement functions. Specifically, it presents an overview of how military 
contracting officers come into existence in the Marine Corps. 
1. HQMC Guidance 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code lists qualifications required of an individual who is to 
serve in an acquisition position as a contracting officer. These qualifications state that 
such a person must: 
1. Have completed all mandatory contracting courses required for a 
contracting officer at the grade level that the person is serving in; 
2. Have at least two years of experience in a contracting position; 
3. Have received a baccalaureate degree from an accredited 
institution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees and have 
completed at least 24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of 
study from an accredited institution of higher education in any of 
the following disciplines: accounting, business finance, law, 
contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, 
marketing, quantitative methods, and organization and 
management; and 
4. Meet such additional requirements, based on the dollar value and 
the complexity of the contracts awarded or administered in the 
position, as may be established by the Secretary of Defense for the 
position. [Ref. 15] 
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To augment this mandate and further refine it, the Department of Defense has 
issued DOD Instruction 5000.52M [Ref. 16] and the Secretary of the Navy has issued 
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5300.36 [Ref. 17]. Each provided more elaborate 
guidance at the respected levels. From these three documents, the Marine Corps 
extracted the pertinent policies and procedures required to remain in conformance with 
the spirit of the orders. As such, the Marine Corps has become an active participant in 
assigning military officers to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, to 
obtain the education necessary to become qualified military contracting officers. 
2. Naval Postgraduate School Education 
Marine Corps Order 1520.9F [Ref. 18] is the document that establishes the 
Special Education Program within the Marine Corps. This program has been a means for 
the Marine Corps to fill pre-identified, specific Marine Corps billets with Marine officers 
possessing a graduate level degree. Annually, a Marine Administration Message 
(MARADMIN) is released that solicits applications for consideration by the Special 
Education Program selection board. Also in the message is a list of disciplines that 
applications will be accepted for, with Acquisition and Contract Management being one 
of them. To apply, the officer fills out an application in the form of an Administrative 
Action (AA) form and has two original transcripts of his undergraduate education sent 
directly from the college/university to the Naval Postgraduate School. There are no 
prerequisites of contracting experience needed in applying for the Acquisition and 
Contract Management discipline. However, each discipline has different thresholds for 
acceptance. 
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The selection process for acceptance into the special education program has been 
two fold. First, the school itself reviewed the educational records of the officer and 
through an objective rating system, determined if the officer will be admitted to the 
school in one of the applied disciplines. Second, the Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
Department of the Marine Corps holds a board to subjectively review the officer's 
performance record to consider him for participation. Upon being favorably evaluated by 
both processes, the officer may then be selected to participate in the Special Education 
Program and can expect orders assigning him to the Naval Postgraduate School within 
the year. [Ref. 18] 
The Naval Postgraduate School exists: 
For the sole purpose of increasing the combat effectiveness of the Navy 
and Marine Corps. It accomplishes this by providing post-baccalaureate 
degree and non-degree programs in a variety of sub-specialty areas not 
available through other educational institutions. [Ref. 19:p. 7] 
The mission of the school is to "increase the combat effectiveness of U.S and 
Allied Armed Forces and enhance the security of the United States through advanced 
education and research programs focused on the technical, analytical and managerial 
tools needed to confront defense related challenges of the future." [Ref. 19:p. 7] 
The School has been highly regarded by the senior leadership in the Department 
of the Navy, as witnessed below in the excerpt from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Jay Johnson, stating: 
Selection for graduate education at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
is one of the most visible symbols of the confidence the U.S. Navy has 
rested in an individual's professional ability and career potential. 
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The rigorous educational programs offered at NPS are among the most 
technically advanced and academically challenging in the country. They 
not only fulfill the Navy's need for specialists in many high-tech fields, 
they also provide students with a sound basis for achieving a broadened 
perspective on global issues and challenges that lie ahead. [Ref. 19:p. 6] 
As an Acquisition and Contract Management student at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the officer spends eighteen months studying in a challenging academic 
curriculum. The Marine Corps officer, who is a student, will spend over 140 in-class 
hours taking courses in accounting, economics, mathematics, information technology, 
contract administration, contract pricing and negotiations, policy and budgeting, 
organization and management, contract law, and strategic management. Upon successful 
completion of this program, the student becomes DA WIA Level II certified and is 
reassigned to the fleet as a military contracting officer for a payback tour. [Ref. 19] 
3. Payback Tours 
As the military has bought billions of dollars worth of equipment, supplies, and 
services each year, the military contracting officer has negotiated, written and monitored 
purchasing contracts. The Marine Corps officer, who graduates from the Naval 
Postgraduate School with an advanced degree in Acquisition and Contract Management, 
has been assigned a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of 9656, 
Contracting Officer. This MOS is also an acquisition workforce career field as defined 
by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act in Title 10 US Code. [Ref. 20] 
The newly appointed military contracting officer embarks on a four year payback 
tour (obligated period of service) within the Marine Corps spending three years in the 
field contracting structure and one year back in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). [Ref. 21] 
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Under the direction of the Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Department, the 
billets available for contracting officers fall into three general groups: 
1. The policy billets, which are located at HQMC, provide guidance and 
direction on policies; 
2. The field contracting billets, which are located at the logistics bases, recruit 
depots and three major Marine Corps Bases (Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune 
and Okinawa), that provide all contracting services for their respective 
mission areas; and 
3. The contingency contracting billets, which are located in the Force Service 
Support Groups at the three major bases mentioned above, that provide 
contracting support to forces deployed. 
It is important to note at this time that the current organizational design does not 
provide United States Marine Corps contracting officer billets at major buying 
commands: the Department of the Navy, the Defense Contract Management Agency or 
other Department of Defense organizations. [Ref. 22:p. 21] 
After the greater part of five years in schooling and a payback tour, the Marine 
Corps military contracting officer is then reassigned to the operational forces in his/her 
primary Military Occupational Specialty (infantry, artillery, logistics, adjutant, etc). The 
challenge is clear: after being schooled and trained in the technical field of contracting for 
such an extended period of time, the officer has undoubtedly fallen behind in his primary 
Military Occupational Specialty skills. He or she must now work to regain that edge in 
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order to recover his MOS credibility and be competitive for promotion with his peers. 
This is a difficult task to endure. 
4. The Acquisition Professional Community 
Annually, since 1991, a Marine Administration Message has been released by 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) that solicits applications for selection to the 
Acquisition Professional Community. This program was established in response to 
mandates in the Title 10 U.S. Code and subsequent Department of Defense Instructions. 
The Acquisition Professional Community (APC) prepares officers for assignment to 
senior acquisition positions. The formal board reviews the applications for selection in 
the fields of program management; communications and computer systems; contracting; 
systems planning/research/development and engineering; test and evaluation engineering; 
manufacturing, production and quality assurance; acquisition logistics; and business/cost 
estimating and financial management. If selected, the officer would than be assigned one 
of three new Military Occupational Specialties. These are Acquisition Manager (9959), 
Acquisition Management Officer (9958), or Acquisition Professional Candidate (9957). 
[Ref. 23] There is a litany of required training, education, rank and experience associated 
to becoming a member of this community. [Ref. 24] 
The disconnect is clear: there is no direct path or continuous flow of performing 
the technical duties associated with being a contracting officer in the Marine Corps. An 
officer will enter the service and perform in his/her primary Military Occupational 
Specialty for 5-10 years. Then, if selected, he/she will attend graduate school at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and do a payback tour of three years as a contracting officer. 
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The officer will then return to his/her primary MOS for four to seven years and attempt to 
reapply to the acquisition community for a follow on tour of duty. In between each of the 
latter three tours, a lot of valuable knowledge and experience is suppressed. What will be 
examined later in this study is the feasibility of staying in the technical and challenging 
MOS of contracting once the officer is originally inducted into the community. It would 
appear at this point that it is economical from a monetary standpoint and from an 
educational and experience standpoint. 
C. CURRENT EXISTING MARINE CORPS MILITARY OFFICER 
CONTRACTING BILLETS 
As mentioned earlier in this study, all of the current billets available for Marine 
Corps military contracting officers fall under the HQMC field contracting structure. 
They are grouped in the three general categories of policy billets, field contracting billets 
and contingency contracting billets. All three categories together total only 19 billets 
available for qualified contracting officers within the entire Marine Corps. One of those 
billets is currently being filled by an officer who did not go through the formal 
contracting education process discussed earlier and is of a different Military Occupational 
Specialty. This leaves only 18 billets for qualified military contracting officers. Currently 
at NPS, there are six officers nearing completion of their contracting education. Upon 
graduation in December of 2000, these six military contracting officers will be assigned 
to one of the 18 billets available. That means there will be a 33% turnover in the 
contacting force at one time. The military contracting officer billets comprise merely 3% 
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of the Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce. The education and training the officers 
receive at the Naval Postgraduate School makes them very versatile for billet assignments 
and would qualify them to fill at least 70% of the billets in the Marine Corps acquisition 
workforce. [Ref. 11 :p. 48] This does not add to the stability of such a technical specialty 
field and presents a possible "spike" in the learning curve of the military contracting 
community. The nineteen billets currently slated for qualified military officers are 
depicted in Figure 2.1 on the following page: 
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Title Grade Command Location 
Contracting Officer Major Policy & Oversight Branch, Washington DC 
HQMC 
Contracting Officer Major Policy & Oversight Branch, Washington DC 
HQMC 
Regional Contracting Major Marine Corps Base Camp Okinawa, Japan 
Officer Butler 
Regional Contracting Major Marine Corps Base Camp North Carolina 
Officer Lejeune 
Regional Contracting Major Marine Corps Base Camp California 
Officer Pendleton 
Regional Contracting Major Marine Corps Support Missouri 
Officer Activity 
Contracting Officer Major Marine Corps Systems Virginia 
Command 
Contracting Officer Major Marine Corps Logistics Georgia 
Base 
Contracting Officer * Major Advanced Amphibious Virginia 
Assault Vehicle Program 
Office 
Regional Contracting Captain Marine Corps Base 29 California 
Officer Palms 
Regional Contracting Captain MCRD Parris Island South Carolina 
Officer 
Regional Contracting Captain MCRD San Diego California 
Officer 
Regional Contracting Captain MARFORRES Louisiana 
Officer 
Contracting Officer Captain Blount Island Command Florida 
Contingency Contracting Captain 151 FSSG California 
Officer 
Contingency Contracting Captain 2nd FSSG North Carolina 
Officer 
Contingency Contracting Captain 3n1 FSSG Okinawa, Japan 
Officer 
Contracting Officer Major IMEF California 
Contracting Officer Major II MEF North Carolina 
* currently filled by a non-contractmg tramed officer 
Figure 2.1 List of Military Contracting Officer Billets in the USMC From Ref. [25] 
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Figure 2.2 shows additional contracting offices within the Marine Corps that do 
not currently have billets for military contracting officers but do have a contracting staff 
and a contracting mission: 
Command/Vnit Location 
LBC,HQMC Washington DC 
Regional Contracting Office, HQMC Washington DC 
MCAS Cherry Point North Carolina 
MARFORPAC Hawaii 
MARFORLANT Virginia 
MCAS Miramar California 
MCAS Yuma Arizona 
MCAS Iwakuni Japan 
MCBHawaii Hawaii 
MCAS Beaufort South Carolina 
MCAF Quantico Virginia 
Marine Barracks 8"' & I Washington DC 
HQBN,HQMC Virginia 
ARD Office, HQMC Washington DC 
MARFOREUR Germany 
MWTC, Bridgeport California 
MARFORSOUTH Florida 
MCLB Barstow California 
Figure 2.2 Contracting Offices within the USMC without Military Contracting 
Officer Billets From Ref. [26] 
D. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF USMC MILITARY 
CONTRACTING OFFICERS 
[The Marine Corps Contracting Campaign plan] embodies our 
commitment for enhancing the keystone support that the contracting 
community must provide for our Marine Corps to continue to be the 
nation's elite fighting corps. 
LtGen. McKissack 
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Commanding General, Installations and Logistics, HQMC [Ref. 27] 
The United States Marine Corps contracting campaign plan begins by discussing 
how the contracting community has been "historically encumbered by a morass of 
statutes, policies and procedures." The move now is to streamline the process through 
introducing and implementing innovative technology and knowledge management 
systems. It acknowledges the fact that as the business world changes, so does the Marine 
Corps. It also addresses the paraphrased facts that "no longer can one rest on methods 
and procedures of the past." As the technological and regulatory requirements of the 
procurement process change, it impacts the core competencies of the contracting 
community, which in turn challenges the members of this community to continuously 
update their skill base. The underlying vision is a "pledge to continuously evolve with 
emerging technologies and strive to enhance (the contacting personnel's) core 
competencies to develop the premier DOD contracting workforce." [Ref. 27:pp. 1-2] 
There are numerous strategies and objectives presented in the Marine Corps 
Contracting Campaign plan. Three are pertinent to this study: 
1. Developing a contracting career track for civilian Marines; 
2. Exploring a strategy to optimize resources; and 
3. Educating and recruiting personnel to upgrade critical technology skills 
required in the modem contracting environment. 
These will be evaluated in-depth in a later chapter, but it is important to note a 
few things about each one. Regarding the first issue above, this study clearly stated 
previously that it was not going to review the civilian or enlisted Marine contacting 
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community. However, the importance of presenting issue number one above is the mere 
fact that this is mentioned as a strategy while an identical strategy for military contracting 
officers is omitted or not addressed. 
Issue number two above looks to optimize resources, and in the researcher's 
opinion, the military contracting officers are an important and vital portion of those 
resources. 
Lastly, issue number three above is concerned with educating and recruiting 
personnel to flow with the changes and keep the contracting force stable. This presents 
another characteristic that military contacting officers can provide if the organizational 
design is re-configured as such. [Ref. 27:pp. 3-13] 
As Purchasing and Contracting Managers, military officers review requests for 
supplies and services, prepare bid invitations or requests for proposals for contracts with 
civilian firms, review bids or proposals and award contacts. They also prepare formal 
contracts, specifying all necessary terms and conditions, and review work to make sure 
that it meets the requirements of the contract. Some helpful fields of study include 
management and business or public administration. The ability to develop detailed plans, 
an interest in work that requires accuracy and strict attention to detail, and an interest in 
negotiating have all been found to be helpful attributes for a contacting manager to 
possess as well. [Ref. 28:p. 262] 
The United States Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) manual 
states that: 
Contracting officers evaluate contract requirements, specifications, bids, 
proposals, and subsequent contractor performance. When appointed in 
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, contracting officers 
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have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make 
related determinations and findings. Contracting officers may bind the 
Government only to the extent of the authority delegated to them. [Ref. 
29:pp. 1-60] 
Specific duties of contracting officers are also listed in the MOS manual. Those 
duties consist of: 
1. Provide planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition support 
to various Marine Corps appropriation sponsors; review acquisition 
plans, statements of work, performance work statements, economy 
act orders, specifications, requests for proposals and invitations for 
bids; evaluate contract proposals, bids and contractor performance; 
award and administer contracts; 
2. Supervise others in the conduct of Marine Corps contracting 
functions; 
3. Make determinations and findings as well as determine obligations 
for the settlement of controversies and protests on Government 
contracts; and 
4. Perform contingency contracting functions in support of the 
conduct of war, operations other then war, exercises and 
deployments. [Ref. 29:pp. 1-61] 
The actual missions carried out by each military contracting officer vary 
depending upon the individual unit the officer is assigned. The policy billets at HQMC 
(I&L) provide the guidance and direction, while the field contracting officer billets 
mainly provide contracting services for the Marine Corps Base activities and the 
contingency contracting officer billets support the forces deployed. While there is a 
particular billet on the east coast at a specific command, the identical billet at the 
equivalent west coast unit operates in an entirely different manner. The best example of 
this is the contracting officer at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island as 
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compared to the contracting officer at MCRD San Diego. The MCRD Parris Island 
office is physically located at Parris Island, South Carolina, and supports the East coast 
recruit depot, the recruiting districts and substations east of the Mississippi river and the 
major bases in the area. The MCRD San Diego office is supposed to perform the same 
functions for the west coast recruit depot and the recruiting districts and substations west 
of the Mississippi river. However, technically the MCRD San Diego contracting office 
does not exist. The officer assigned to that contracting officer billet has relocated to the 
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton contracting office and supports the general 
contracting mission of that region through that office. The attention given to all the 
recruiting districts and substations west of the Mississippi river becomes more of a 
collateral duty. 
A similar organizational pattern for mission support discussed above in the two 
MCRD contracting offices is reflected in the military contracting officer chain of 
command throughout the Marine Corps. Referring to the two MCRD contracting officers 
on each coast, the officer filling the billet at Parris Island reports to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Supplies and Services who is a Colonel/0-6 equivalent and the officer filling the 
MCRD San Diego billet reports to the Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton contracting 
officer who is a Major/0-4 equivalent. Not only do these two officers report to the senior 
officers noted above, but they also have their performance evaluations written by them 
annually. Similar inconsistencies exist like this in the military contracting officer 
community throughout the Marine Corps contracting activities. [Ref. 30] 
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E. MARINE CORPS LEGAL COMMANDS 
The United States Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force (FMF) is made up of three 
Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) that cover the entire span of the globe in an 
operational sense. I MEF is located on the west coast of the United States, II MEF is 
located on the east coast of the United States, and III MEF is located in Okinawa, Japan. 
Under each MEF, there is a division, an aircraft wing and a Force Service Support Group 
(FSSG). This supports the Marine Corps concept of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). The Divisions execute amphibious assault operations and other such 
operations as may be directed, while supported by Marine aviation, Force Service 
Support units and other supporting forces. The Aircraft Wings participate as the 
supporting air component of the Fleet Marine Force in the seizure and defense of 
advanced naval bases and conduct such operations as necessary for the prosecution of a 
naval campaign. The Force Service Support Groups provide combat service support to 
all the elements of a MEF. In doing so, all of the elements of the FSSG are structured to 
provide permanently organized sub-elements to support independently deployed units. 
The units that make up a FSSG are: a Headquarters and Service (H&S) Battalion, 
a Maintenance Battalion, a Supply Battalion, an Engineer Support Battalion, a 
Transportation and Landing Support Battalion, a Medical Battalion, and a Dental 
Battalion. The H&S Battalion can be dissected even further and the reader would find 
that it is made up of a Headquarters Company, a Service Company, a Communications 
Company, and a Military Police Company. Within the Service Company of the H&S 
Battalion are the bulk of the Marine Corps legal specialists. They form the Legal 
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Services Support Section (LSSS) consisting of over 100 Marines. It is this unit that is 
tasked with providing general support to the MEF in terms of legal services. [Ref. 31] 
The Legal Services Support Section is the command entity that provides internal 
and external support for the requirements of MAGTF elements. This is done by using 
legal services support teams. Each major subordinate command (Division/Aircraft 
Wing/Force Service Support Group) has a Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) section that 
coordinates legal support services accordingly. These teams work closely with the major 
subordinate command Staff Judge Advocate and are flexible in nature. They are 
employed at appropriate times and places, in various sizes and numbers, as well as 
various compositions, depending upon the mission, size and MAGTF composition; 
expected duration of the operation; and according to the scheme of maneuver involved in 
the operations. Just as the war fighting major subordinate commands have small SJA 
sections, so do the many Marine Corps Base garrison units, Expeditionary Units and Air 
Stations. These units also do the coordinating and liaison work with the Legal Services 
Support Section of the FSSGs who are the primary workhorses for Marine Corps legal 
activity. [Ref. 32] 
F. THE DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA) 
The Defense Contract Management Agency is really on the front lines of 
our efforts to change the way we do business in the Department of 
Defense. This assures our war fighters have the very best equipment at an 
affordable price. 
Dr. Jacques Gansler 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
[Ref. 33] 
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The beginning of the 20th century saw technological advances open a new field for 
contracting and contract management. In February 1908, the Army's Signal Corps 
awarded a contract to the Wright brothers to produce a flying machine that would 
transport two men at 40 miles per hour for at least 60 minutes. Management of the first 
U.S. military aircraft contract was simply a detailed final inspection ofthe final product. 
The U.S. military considered contract management to be limited to inspection. 
In World War I, the largest military mobilization since the Civil War, the 
government shelved competitive bidding as the Army awarded contracts to clothe and 
equip the troops. The Army and Navy awarded contracts for aircraft to grow an infant 
industry. In 1916, Congress authorized 40 aircraft inspections, and the following year, the 
Army Signal Corps formed an aircraft inspection department to bolster production. It was 
the first organizational element solely concerned with managing military aircraft 
contracts. Officials realized they needed a responsible inspection system to detect defects 
in critical areas and have them corrected during the manufacturing process. This paved 
the way for the first in-plant inspection offices. 
As the airplane dominated procurement between the world wars, the Army Air 
Service set up the first peacetime in-plant inspection office in 1921 at Boeing Aircraft Co. 
in Seattle, Wash., and at the Douglas Aircraft Co. in Santa Monica, Calif., in 1923. 
To bolster the aviation industry that slumped after World War I, Congress in 1926 
required competitive pricing for aircraft and, with the Navy Aviation Act and Army Air 
Corps Act, increased the flexibility of the procurement process. The law established a 
special branch within the Air Corps to supervise the inspection activities of three 
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procurement district offices - New York City, New York, Dayton, Ohio and Santa 
Monica, California. Air Corps plant representative offices managed contracts at various 
manufacturing sites. 
In 1934, after complaints of excessive profits by Navy contractors, Congress 
passed the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, to limit profits on specific types of government 
contracts. The law also opened the plants and records of Navy contractors and 
subcontractors to inspection and audit. 
By 1940, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered aircraft production to 
soar to 50,000 airplanes a year, wartime yet again highlighted problems with military 
contract management. 
The services then decentralized their procurement processes after World War II. 
The Air Force, separated from the Army in 1 94 7, created six intermediate headquarters 
and increased its plant representative offices from four to 36. 
Contract management began to change its focus in the early 1950s. During the 
Korean War, contract management professionals assured the contractor's performance by 
reviewing the company's systems and procedures, resulting in more efficient contract 
management. 
During that time, procurement turned to negotiated and cost reimbursement 
contracts for major weapons and aerospace systems in the 1950s and 1960s. The Army, 
Air Force and Navy set up separate commands to oversee contracting. For instance, in 
1962 the newly established Army Materiel Command assumed responsibility for the 
procurement functions of the Army's technical services. 
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In February 1962, more than 20 defense procurement officials met in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, with a task to develop a plan for establishing uniform field 
contract management functions such as quality control, review of subcontracting 
processes, property administration, industrial security review, and price proposal reviews. 
Three months later, Project 60 established the Directorate of Contract Administration 
Services and set up a pilot test region in Philadelphia. 
By 1964, all of the contract administration offices in the military service and the 
Defense Supply Agency consolidated as the Defense Contract Administration Service 
(DCAS). The new organization provided contract administration, contractor performance 
surveillance, inspection and acceptance of materiel, accounting for government property, 
security clearance of contractor facilities, and personnel to handle classified information, 
and payment of contractors. 
Certain plant representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force, situated in key 
plants producing major weapons systems were not consolidated. Nor were the military 
and civilian construction contractors of the Army Corps of Engineers, Navy Bureau of 
Yards and Docks, and Navy Supervisors of Shipbuilding. 
Further examination of defense contract administration in 1975 and a study by the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in 1977 led to more streamlining, further reductions 
and a consolidation of efforts. 
Increases in defense spending m the 1980s led to still more regulations of 
contracting, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation of 1984 that is a single regulation 
governing procurement practices of all federal agencies. In July 1989, a Defense task 
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force recommended contract consolidation under a Defense Contract Management 
Agency to save almost $30 million over five years. The contract management oversight 
instead became a function of a Defense Contract Management Command under DLA. 
Tremendous savings occurred over the next ten years. Between 1989 and 1999, 
DCMC went from 14 regions and districts down to three. The number of Contract 
Administration Offices went from 144 to 67, and the number of employees shrank from 
26,500 in 1989, to 12,500 in 2000. 
With the major consolidation of contract management completed, the Department 
of Defense implemented the 1989 task force recommendation, and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) became a separate agency March 27,2000. 
The Defense Contract Management Agency is the Department of Defense contract 
manager, responsible for ensuring federal acquisition programs, supplies, and services are 
delivered on time, within cost, and meet performance requirements. This involves 
managing 325,000 prime contracts with current work valued at $852 billion. As a result, 
DCMA directly contributes to United States military readiness. 
The Defense Contract Management Agency is headquartered at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, and is organized into three Districts: 1) East, 2) West, and 3) International. The 
Defense Contract Management Agency oversees 67 Contract Management Offices that 
are responsible for the work performed at over 900 operating locations worldwide. 
DCMA employs over 12,000 civilian and military professionals to carry out its mission. 
These professionals serve as "information brokers" for military buying agencies - both 
during the acquisition cycle and throughout the life of a contract. Employees interact on a 
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daily basis with customers to ensure that the services DCMA provides meet customers' 
needs: 
1. Pre-Award: DCMA provides pre-contractual advice services during the 
acquisition phase to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential 
performance risks, select capable contractors, and write contracts that are 
easily administered with less risk of costly modifications. 
2. Post-Award: DCMA maintains insight into the contractors' processes to 
ensure product, cost, and schedules are in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract. This includes on-site surveillance and program-
specific processes that cannot be monitored by off-site buying agencies. 
The comprehensive, top-level support DCMA provides to its· customers has 
earned the Agency a leadership role in the DoD Defense Reform Initiatives that will 
continue to guide the Department throughout the 21 51 century. [Ref. 34] 
G. THE UNITED STATES ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS 
The Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) (ODASA(P)) 
is responsible for management and oversight of all procurement and procurement related 
functions and organizations, acquisition reform, and the industrial base, Army wide. This 
includes providing contracting assistance and procurement policy direction; management 
of the procurement career field; stimulation, identification, implementation and oversight 
of acquisition reforms; guidance on weapon systems acquisition; and industrial base 
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management and policy guidance. ODASA(P) serves the entire Army acquisition 
community, the Army Senior Procurement Executive and Acquisition Executive, and the 
Army Secretariat and Staff. It is also responsible for related strategic planning and 
enterprise level metrics for the Army acquisition and contracting community. 
The Army Acquisition Corps has a detailed policy that ensures the professionals 
develop and stay current in leadership, disciplinary and functional skills that augment the 
minimum education, training and experience. Included in this policy is a plan to re-focus 
the Army's efforts to maintain its "world class career program and create the future". 
[Ref. 35] 
The United States Army has almost 600 contracting and industrial management 
officers. Of that, there are 199 contingency contracting officer billets. At the theater 
level, contracting support is found in the Army Service Component Command and in the 
Theater Support Command. These billets perform the Head of Contracting agency 
(HCA) and Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) functions. Duties 
include planning, oversight and management of in-theater contracting. The operational 
level has contracting personnel at both the Division and Corps levels. As buying 
organizations, they are also responsible for writing appropriate level contracting support 
plans. In a proactive effort to support its mission through the 2J51 century, the Army has 
made organizational changes to meet its requirements. This has resulted in increasing its 
contingency contracting forces alone by over 67%, or 80 billets, since 1997. [Ref. 36:pp. 
6-35] 
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In addition to theater level, operational level and contingency contracting billets 
discussed above, the Army also aggressively staffs the Defense Contract Management 
Agency with qualified contracting officers. There are 42 Program Management Offices 
that are responsible for an array of products that are not unique to the Army, but inherent 
to all the services. They have more than two hundred contracting personnel that maintain 
billions of dollars of contracts and provide oversight to over 2500 contractors. The Army 
also staffs Joint Defense Program Offices for biological defense, missile defense, military 
traffic management, communications and electronics, and special operations. [Ref. 35] 
The transfer to the Army Acquisition Corps as a contracting officer is a permanent 
one. It is a permanent command structured to support the contracting requirements of the 
Army today and in the future. As an Army officer in the fleet, an officer will fill billets 
and perform the duties associated with his primary military occupational specialty 
(infantry, artillery, armor, supply, etc). At around the eight-year point of time in service 
and rank of mid-level Captain or higher, the officer applies to transfer into the 
Acquisition Corps. Along with the rank/time in service prerequisite, the officer must 
have a competitive file in terms of his Officer Evaluation Reports and Officer Record 
Brief and also have his company command tour behind him. If the lateral move is 
approved, the officer is formally educated in contracting at the Naval Postgraduate 
School or another similar institution and becomes a contracting officer in the Army for 
the remainder of his time in the service. The field has a career path for growth and 
promotion purposes and has the hundreds of contracting officer billets mentioned earlier 
for the officer to apply his experience, expertise and technical knowledge. As the Army 
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Acquisition Corps prepares to celebrate its tenth birthday this year, it continues to refine 
the way it conducts business and adjusts its organizational design to be exceptionally 
prepared to support and lead the Army through the 21st century with a qualified, 
permanent and stable contracting force. [Ref. 3 7] 
H. SUMMARY 
In the Department of Defense, the procurement community has seen many 
attempts to change the policies, procedures and organizational design m which it 
operates. From the Revolutionary War period up through today, different commissions, 
reports and studies have made multiple recommendations for improvement. It is 
important to note that in most cases the recommendations were generally the same. The 
procurement policies and procedures are cumbersome while the structure of the personnel 
force is disjointed and unstable. All three characteristics present a significant burden in 
trying to get the contracting mission executed in a professional, efficient and effective 
manner. As each of the commissions, reports and studies continued to identify the same 
deficiencies year after year, the question has to be raised as to why swift, efficient and 
conclusive action wasn't taken early and as often as necessary to promote unyielding 
results of success in the procurement community? 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act that was passed by 
Congress in 1990 was the first real step in the right direction. It began to create the sense 
of a truly centralized policy and decentralized execution concept. As such, the United 
States Marine Corps has set up a good point of entry to the contracting world through its 
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participation in the Special Education Program. The military contracting officers obtain 
the background in contracting theory needed in order to apply it in real world applications 
during a pay back tour. The issue remains to be analyzed in Chapter IV of this study as to 
whether the current design of employment of the contracting officers is in the best 
interests of those officers and the service and if it is too disjointed to promote efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
This chapter has also investigated how the United States Army trains and employs 
its contracting officer force. From that it can be seen that those Army officers acquire the 
technical skills and education in contracting and continue to use it in every tour of duty 
thereafter. In addition to providing the support needed to the Army for its contracting 
requirements, the officers and the Army broaden their field of knowledge, experience and 
expertise by performing the contracting functions at billets in the Defense Contract 
Management Agency. This chapter also identified that within the Defense Contract 
Management Agency there are no billets filled by qualified Marine Corps military 
contracting officers. 
Finally, this chapter briefly presented the overall organizational design of the 
United States Marine Corps. It further broke down the major subordinate command 
responsible for providing combat service support. Not only did it outline the current units 
with contracting missions, some staffed with qualified military contracting officers and 
some without, but it also presented background information on a stable force structure in 
which the Marine Corps legal specialists operate. 
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III. ADDITIONAL DATA 
A. INTERVIEWS 
For the purpose of this study and in addition to the data collected in Chapter II, 
the researcher interviewed various members of the contracting community. The 
individuals who were interviewed fall under an array of different commands that organize 
their contracting sections differently and execute their missions in a somewhat 
decentralized manner. Highlights of the interviews and key points are presented in the 
sections that follow. 
1. USMC Military Contracting Officers 
Eleven out of sixteen officers currently in the contracting community said that at 
the end of their payback tour they will more than likely leave active duty service and get 
out of the Marine Corps. That amounts to almost 70% of the current contracting 
community. Six of those eleven mentioned above said they will definitely be getting out. 
From the five officers of the sixteen who said they will stay on active duty in the Marine 
Corps after their payback tour: two recently got promoted which means an additional 
obligated time in service; one will be retiring shortly after the payback tour; and another 
will wait to see if he is promoted. If he is not promoted, he would likely join the other 
eleven officers in the decision to leave the Marine Corps. 
All of the Marine Corps military contracting officers interviewed were educated at 
the Naval Postgraduate School and almost 50% of them have furthered their professional 
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education by attending Defense Acquisition University follow-on contracting courses 
(Con 234, 237, etc). In applying that education and performing their duties as contracting 
officers, each procures items from the three general categories of equipment, supplies and 
services. 
In conducting the interviews with these officers, the researcher posed a question 
about how the contracting officers felt about doing a follow-on tour in contracting with 
the Defense Contract Management Agency if given the opportunity. All but one 
excitedly and enthusiastically said it was a great idea and they would thoroughly enjoy 
such a broadening opportunity. The one dissident had recently been promoted to the rank 
of Lieutenant Colonel and wanted to leave the contracting field in order to return to the 
particular unit he had come from prior to his contracting tour to be the executive officer 
for that command. Aside from that, 1 00% of the contracting officers that were 
interviewed united in saying that the move to becoming a qualified contracting officer 
should be a lateral move. That means that once the service (and the officer) makes the 
commitment to retain, educate and employ him as a contracting officer, every tour after 
that should be in the form of filling a contracting type billet. Each officer echoed the 
other by saying that contracting was a technically challenging and detail demanding 
profession that must be continuously utilized in order to remain proficient and current in 
it. Some even offered the opinion that in order to retain these officers with such an 
expertise that a lateral move would be a sure way to do it. Another key point that all of 
the current contracting officers interviewed unanimously agreed on was the fact that the 
Marine Corps needs more qualified contracting officers. For reasons as simple as 
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contracting officers bringing something different to the table to support the war fighters 
and as generic as applying a Marine Corps perspective in a joint arena, each could not 
emphasize the point enough. 
For purposes to be analyzed later in this study, it is important to also note that all 
of the field contracting officers do receive some sort of legal support through their local 
or regional area counsels. This support generally consists of reviews and/or advising. At 
the larger commands on the West coast, the contracting officers use the Western Area 
Counsel Office (WACO), while the larger commands on the East coast use the Eastern 
Area Counsel Office (EACO). The smaller commands throughout the Marine Corps use 
local support activity counsels. 
The overall feeling about the readiness of the military contracting officer force in 
general was that it was high. The interviewees highlighted the fact that the force is 
currently a mature one; most have been in their current contracting officer billets for over 
a year and a half now. Every officer did point out that this was not the case when they 
first began their payback tours. Again, the contracting officers united in saying the 
education they received at the Naval Postgraduate School was superb, however it was 
strictly theory. Understandingly, what was missing was practical application. The three 
areas continuously identified by the interviewees as deficiencies were the education and 
training in filling out of the particular forms used in the contracting environment, the 
concepts of contingency contracting and the understanding and use of the Standard 
Procurement System (SPS). Each officer said those were the activities most associated 
with filling the billets in the Marine Corps contracting community once they began their 
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payback tour. It should also be stated that the contracting officers said the first full year 
of their payback tour was spent learning the "system" and getting adjusted to their new 
positions. After that point in time, they had the ability, confidence and understanding of 
the "real world" in Marine Corps contracting. 
Ten of the current military contracting officers interviewed specifically said that 
they thought entering the contracting field with a background or a Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) in fmancial management, supply or logistics is a big advantage. More 
so, that such a background lends itself to a better understanding of how the world of 
combat service support operates. They again echoed how valuable the Naval 
Postgraduate School education was and that an officer entering into the contract realm 
from the combat arms community would be equally set up for success, however, often the 
learning curve was a little steeper in such cases. The most important characteristic or trait 
that was offered by the interviewees as being critical for contracting officers was the need 
for Fleet Marine Force (FMF) experience. The reason stated for this was that the Fleet 
Marine Force is the customer; that is who the field contracting officers support and that is 
who they must intimately operate with when they are deployed. 
Eight of the current contracting officers interviewed stated that they were 
planning on applying to the Acquisition Professional Community. In discussing this area, 
all eight voiced two main concerns. The first was a concern about their level of primary 
MOS expertise after being away from it for five years. The second concern was after 
going back to their primary MOS and being away from the contracting community for 
three to four years, they were concerned about the ability to stay current with their 
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contracting skill set and all the regulatory, policy and procedural changes during their 
absenteeism. At this point, the officers again echoed in unison about the idea of 
remaining in the contracting field for the remainder of their time in the service versus 
returning to their primary MOS "two steps behind" everyone else. [Refs. 30, 38-52] 
The Regional Contracting Officer (RCO) for the western recruiting region works 
out of the base contracting office at Camp Pendleton, California. However, his primary 
staff members are physically located at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) in San 
Diego, California, forty miles to the South. He has become a member of the portion of 
the contracting community that is attempting to consolidate contracting offices through 
"geo-regionalization". As such, the MCRD San Diego, Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp 
Pendleton and 151 Force Service Support Group (FSSG) contracting officers all work out 
of the same office. Each focuses on his particular unit's contracting mission while 
creating a bigger, more readily available pool of expertise, knowledge, and experience. 
The Regional Contracting Officer for the western recruiting region stated his mission as 
contracting equipment, supplies and services in support of Marine forces deployed and in 
garrison. In executing his mission, the Regional Contracting Officer for the western 
recruiting region provides oversight for contracting actions to the recruiting districts West 
of the Mississippi River. He also considers his customer base to be I Marine 
Expeditionary Force (I MEF), the 1st Marine Division, the 1st FSSG, and the 3rct Marine 
Aircraft Wing as well. In his office at MCB Camp Pendleton he has no people working 
directly for him to accomplish this mission while he operates as a consultant to the 
recruiting stations and helps with the general MCB contracting mission. The Marine 
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Corps Base Camp Pendleton contracting officer who is a Major/0-4 equivalent writes his 
annual performance evaluation and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics who is a 
Colonel/0-6 equivalent reviews it. The Regional Contracting Officer for the western 
recruiting region has an unlimited warrant and a primary military occupational specialty 
of aviation supply. He feels that a background in a service support field, the ability to 
communicate effectively, and someone who is customer oriented are key elements in 
becoming a successful contracting officer. Under the general support concept, he also 
provides assistance to the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, California, 
contracting office. That office is 3 5 miles South and has a bona fide contracting mission 
with no military contracting officer billet currently available. To help the enlisted Marine 
currently performing the contracting mission for Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, the 
Regional Contracting Officer for the western recruiting region provides assistance as 
often as needed. The Regional Contracting Officer feels that all of the air stations in the 
Marine Corps have contracting requirements and need a qualified Marine Corps military 
contracting officer billet created at each one. The idea of establishing a permanent 
contracting command in the Marine Corps and making the transition via a lateral move is 
a concept that this officer feels strongly towards. He is supposed to be returning to this 
primary military occupational specialty of aviation supply in the near future. He had 
voiced concerns about the fact that he has been away from it for five years and things 
have changed. "It's a high tech MOS and I don't know what's going on in terms of 
software, new databases, automated procedures, etc." He is also concerned about not 
being viewed as competitive for promotion with his peers as a result of his hiatus from 
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the aviation supply community to do his contracting tour. Lastly, he feels that after the 
training and education he received, possessing an unlimited contracting warrant and 
having the utmost authority in his contracting duties, that going back to his primary 
military occupational specialty would be a step backwards. [Ref. 30] 
There is a military contracting officer billet on the East coast at the Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island, South Carolina, that is supposed to be identical in 
nature (structure, organization, and mission) to the one on the West coast at MCRD San 
Diego. This billet is appropriately titled Regional Contracting Officer for the eastern 
recruiting region. The officer is physically located at the Parris Island recruit depot and 
has a staff of 14 contracting specialists (both civilian and enlisted Marines) to carry out 
the mission. The office's mission is to support all spending for Parris Island and the 
recruiting districts of the Eastern region. That is exactly what this Regional Contracting 
Officer does. His customer base consists of 23 recruiting sub-stations East of the 
Mississippi River, the recruit depot at Parris Island, a Marine detachment at Fort Gordon, 
MCAS Beaufort and the Beaufort Naval Hospital. As a contracting officer with an 
unlimited warrant, he contracts for equipment, supplies and services to include facility 
contracting (with the exception of MILCON projects). The process of evaluating his 
performance is very different than his counterpart on the West coast. The Regional 
Contracting Officer for the eastern recruiting region has his annual performance 
evaluation written by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply and Services who is a 
Colonel/0-6 equivalent and has it reviewed by the Commanding General for the recruit 
depot who is a Brigadier General/0-7 equivalent. The reporting senior who writes his 
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fitness report is also a customer. The Regional Contracting officer currently filling this 
contracting billet has some concerns about that concept. He stated: 
There is a Department of the Navy memo that says the senior contracting 
officer in the area should report to the senior commander in the region. If 
that Regional Contracting Officer reports to someone other than him, 
there's the possibility for the Regional Contracting Officer to report to a 
customer. That might skew some people's priorities. 
The Regional Contracting Officer for the eastern recruiting region felt that Fleet 
Marine Force experience prior to coming to the contracting community is a "must" as it 
helps the individual understand mission needs and the support concept. When asked how 
he would feel about doing a tour with the Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) as a follow on contracting tour after his current one, he said that it was a great 
idea and he'd love to do it. "After sinking money into my education and adding to that 
my experience, I would be able to provide better support." While he felt that the military 
contacting officer force currently deserves a readiness rating of "good", he envisions a 
greater demand for support and expansionism in the future as the Marine Corps 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) increases and its role in the National Military Strategy 
widens. As such, he feels that the Marine Corps definitely needs (and would benefit 
from) more qualified contracting officers in its ranks. The Regional Contracting Officer 
said the best vehicle for that is to make it a lateral move into the contracting MOS field. 
He is convinced that it is the only way to best retain officers who have the expertise in the 
contracting field and made a point to mention that it is how the Marine Corps does it with 
the enlisted contracting specialists. At the rank of Sergeant, the enlisted Marine applies 
for a lateral move out of his current military occupational specialty and into the 
52 
contracting community. That Marine then goes to a formal school to obtain the education 
and skills needed to become a contracting specialist and returns to the fleet as such. From 
then on out, the remainder of his time in the Marine Corps is spent as a contracting 
specialist. Without a similar opportunity for the military contracting officers in the 
Marine Corps, this particular Regional Contracting Officer feels constrained. He has 
aspirations of applying his sharpened business applications to improve the Marine Corps 
but doesn't foresee it as possible after his payback tour. "I could be a CEO somewhere 
with my experience, CPA and CPCM credentials, but here I can never be the 
commandant and won't be given a follow on tour as a contracting officer." [Ref. 38] 
The Regional Contracting Officer at the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) 
Albany, Georgia, performs the mission of base support contracting for MCLB Albany 
and special projects contracting Material Command. Material Command is made up of 
MCLB Barstow, MCLB Albany, Blount Island Command and Marine Corps Systems 
Command. As the procurement contracting officer for logistics support contracts, this 
Regional Contracting Officer said he works more for Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM) then for MCLB Albany. With an unlimited warrant, he finds 
himself administering contracts for the new Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
(MTVR) truck, the Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and other 
types of Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contracts. The Director of Contracts who is 
a Colonel/0-6 equivalent writes his annual performance evaluation and the Chief of Staff 
for the Logistics Base who is also a Colonel/0-6 equivalent reviews it. Considering the 
workload he has, he feels it would be a good idea to have another qualified contracting 
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officer billet at his site to spread load the mission requirements. He is also in favor of 
contracting officers going on to the Defense Contract Management Agency for a follow 
on tour in contracting in order to continue to serve in a contracting capacity. With "not 
enough contracting officers in programs wearing green suits", he also echoed what the 
majority of the other officers stated in saying contracting should be its own primary 
military occupational specialty. He envisions a lateral move to be the best way to 
accomplish this as well. In this particular Regional Contracting Officer's opinion, the 
opportunities to continue doing contracting after his payback tour are far better outside of 
the Marine Corps than in it, hence his desire to leave the service. [Ref. 39] 
The contracting officer at the Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, Florida, 
provides all the contracting support for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) 
program. The Commanding Officer of Blount Island who is a Colonel/0-6 equivalent 
writes his annual performance evaluation and the Commanding General of MCLB 
Albany who is a Brigadier General/0-7 equivalent reviews it. As a contacting officer 
with an unlimited warrant, he too feels that he could provide excellent service to the 
Defense Contract Management Agency on a follow-on tour as a contracting officer with 
that command. Without such an opportunity, he feels qualified contracting officers are 
wasted. He also stated that "with the contracting community being such a small one, the 
Marine Corps would benefit by allowing these officers to do such a tour". He feels very 
strongly that the Marine Corps needs more contracting officers, that it should make the 
transition to the community be a lateral move, and that such an action would help retain 
the highly skilled military contracting officers the Marine Corps has today. [Ref. 40] 
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Each of the three Force Service Support Groups (FSSG) in the Marine Corps has 
one qualified military contracting officer billet. The researcher interviewed the 
Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) from the 2nd FSSG located at Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina, and 1st FSSG located at Camp Pendleton, California. Their mission is to 
provide contracting support during the time of contingencies to the forward deployed 
units. From their offices, they provide individuals to the Marine Expeditionary Units 
(MEU) that rotate around the globe every six months from their geographical regions. 
The Contingency Contracting Officers have their annual performance evaluations written 
by the Officer-In-Charge of the Supply Management Unit (OIC of the SMU) who is a 
Lieutenant Colonel/0-5 equivalent and the Commanding Officer of Supply Battalion who 
is a Colonel/0-6 equivalent reviews it. It is appropriate to note at this time that this is the 
first instance where the reporting chain on one coast is identical to the one on the opposite 
coast for the same type of unit. Each officer continued to echo the same findings reported 
earlier: that the opportunity to do a follow on tour in contracting at DCMA would be a 
welcomed one; that the Marine Corps needs more contracting officers; and that the 
transition to the military occupational specialty of contracting should be a permanent 
lateral move. [Refs. 41 & 42] 
In discussing the process of coordinating contracting support for the Marine 
Expeditionary Units, it was determined by the Contingency Contracting Officers that this 
concept should be done through liaison with the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
contracting officers. The Contingency Contracting Officer for the 2nd FSSG felt that the 
billet of the MEF contracting officer should be the rank of a Major and one who is doing 
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a second tour in contracting. This is because of the nature of the billet that primarily 
deals with writing contracting plans and annexes that are integrated with the operational 
plans (OPLANS). He thinks that someone who has "been there, done that" would be able 
to perform the functions more effectively. [Ref. 42] 
The situation at the 151 FSSG is a little more complex. The contracting officer that 
is currently assigned to the I MEF contracting officer billet (who is supposed to be the 
officer that the 1st FSSG Contingency Contracting Officer makes liaison with) for all 
intensive purposes is not there. The I MEF contracting officer is a school trained and 
fully qualified contracting officer, however, he comes from an undermanned primary 
military occupational specialty field and he is being allowed to work exclusively in that 
primary MOS field. This results in the Contingency Contracting Officer at the 1st FSSG 
being "dual hated" in an already busy office. The biggest problem he finds next to this is 
the lack of proper use of his contracting services due to a lack of exposure. He has to find 
time and ways to educate seniors as to what the contracting office can bring to the table to 
assist in the various missions. [Ref. 41] 
The researcher also interviewed military personnel in the contracting community 
who are in charge of contracting offices within the Marine Corps that do not currently 
have billets for qualified military contracting officers. These units ranged from major 
commands such as the Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) and Marine Forces South 
(MARFORSOUTH) to the Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and the various 
Marine Corps Air Stations (MCAS). The Marine in charge of contracting for 
MARFORPAC, the major command that supports and controls the forces in the Pacific 
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Rim area, is a Staff Sergeant/E-6 equivalent. She works for a Marine Corps Lieutenant/0-
110-2 equivalent that is formally trained in the MOS of supply. It is important to note that 
the MOS of supply does not provide any education or schooling in the practice of 
contracting. If the Staff Sergeant in contracting has any contracting questions or 
problems, she does not turn to the supply officer but goes directly to Headquarters Marine 
Corps (HQMC) in Washington, D.C. She feels strongly that "an actual trained 
contracting officer would be better to have assigned to [that] office." As such, she too 
thinks that the Marine Corps would benefit by having more qualified contracting officers 
available for contracting assignments. She also stated that a good way to alleviate the 
instability in the military contracting officer force would be to make the move a 
permanent one in the form of a military occupational specialty lateral move. She said that 
"it would be much more beneficial for the contracting community." [Ref. 53] 
The same position at MARFORSOUTH in Miami, Florida, is filled by a Gunnery 
Sergeant/E-7 equivalent. His remarks were virtually identical to the Staff Sergeant's at 
MARFORP AC and he went on to say: 
It is a loss to our community by pulling [qualified military contracting 
officers] out of our field. Our needs are too great today to allow this. The 
Marine Corps needs to do something to fix this. 
He feels that the officers will lose their primary MOS skill sets and be challenged 
in trying to remain competitive in that MOS. At the other end, he feels that after going 
back to their primary MOS and being away from the contracting spectrum, the officers 
will then see their contracting skills deteriorate rapidly because it is such a technical field 
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that is continuously changing. He stands as a big advocate to make contracting a 
permanent field/military occupational specialty for Marine Corps officers. [Ref. 54] 
The military contracting officer at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is a 
Navy Lieutenant/0-3 equivalent who is a member of the Navy Supply Corps. His mission 
is to support the Marine forces and tenant activities at the base by contracting for supplies 
and services. He has no formal contracting education and never attended the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He executes his duties on the basis of extensive On-the-Job-
Training (OJT) in contracting. While he is limited to the simplified acquisition threshold 
of $100,000 for contracting purposes, he must go directly to/through HQMC, 
Washington, D.C., for any actions above that amount. He too feels the Marine Corps 
needs more contracting officers, that a lateral move seems to be the most common sense 
approach to do it and that: 
The current way doesn't make any sense. It is a waste of time. 
[Contracting] is a very, very technical field, equivalent to the need for a 
law degree, and a Marine Corps officer who is qualified in contracting 
should and could be filling this billet. [Ref. 55] 
The contracting officer for the Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, is a 
Navy Lieutenant Commander/0-4 equivalent who was formally educated at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He is another example of a Navy officer performing the contracting 
functions to support the missions of a Marine Corps Base/ Air Station. He has his annual 
performance evaluation written directly by the Commanding Officer of the Air Station 
who is a Colonel/0-6 equivalent. When asked why a Navy Officer was at a Marine Corps 
Air Station performing the contracting functions instead of a qualified Marine Corps 
contracting officer, he stated: 
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SECNAV Instruction 5451.1A dated 15 November 1971 says that 
whenever there are any Department of the Navy Aircraft present, there 
will be a Navy Supply Corps officer present to provide support. However, 
it is dated and I will be rotating soon and a Navy officer will not fill this 
billet again. The Base S-4 officer, a Marine Corps Major who is not 
schooled in contracting, will take over this role. 
He feels that the Marine Corps would benefit by having more contracting officers 
because "it would definitely enhance the Marine Corps' expeditionary capabilities." To 
support this concept, he said that the idea of having a qualified Marine Corps military 
contracting officer at the air station would be a great job for a Captain/0-3 equivalent to 
get the needed field experience. [Ref. 56] The Gunnery Sergeant who fills the same 
billet at the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, echoed these same remarks 
and thinks the Marine Corps military contracting officer force "needs to be more of a 
mainstay." [Ref. 57] 
2. USMC Civilian Contracting Personnel 
The researcher interviewed Mr. Paul Direnzo of Headquarters Marine Corps 
located in Washington, D.C. He is the Deputy Director for Policy and Oversight of 
Contracting, and right now the top senior official in the Marine Corps contracting 
community. The mission of his office is to provide all field contracting support in such 
areas as technical direction, issuing contracting warrants, training the contracting force, 
etc. In the discussion of this research topic, he informed the researcher that this and the 
parallel topic of a career path for military contracting officers has been "one of the hottest 
issues since 1989." That encompasses the training, educating and employing of military 
contracting officers from the Captain/0-3 rank to Colonel/0-6 rank. "It is a very basic 
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concept that has never made the light of day." He feels that it has been unsuccessful to 
date because the field is so small in its current structure and organization. He also felt 
that the learning curve is so great because: 
Year one of the payback tour is spent training and learning the field. Year 
two has the officer actually "doing", like a marksman on the rifle range. 
Year three he becomes an expert at it and then he leaves the field. 
As he refers to the whole situation as a "very politically hot issue", he says that it 
is a command's call on creating/assigning billets. This means that the Contracting 
Branch at HQMC makes recommendations and is the contracting field sponsor, but 
ultimately it is the command's decision to make room on the Table of Organization (T/0) 
for a qualified contracting officer billet. This refers back to what some of the field 
contracting officers referred to as rational ignorance: commands or commanders do not 
fully understand the importance of a contracting officer and what assets and capabilities 
he brings to the battlefield. He said that "line officers, 0-6/0-7 and above ranks, felt that 
the contracting tours hurt the officers in their primary MOS fields." He also offered that 
with an appropriate change in the organizational design of the contracting community, a 
Captain/0-3 equivalent who is at or around the ten year mark in time in service upon 
entering the contracting field could make a career out of contracting if billets were 
available or a permanent command was structured as such. The officers would do a 
garrison support contracting tour (MCB/MCAS), then a deployed contracting support 
tour (or vice versa), a joint tour (with DCMA) and/or then a planning and policy tour 
(HQMC). That would give the officer at least another ten years of time in service for a 
total of over twenty years in the Marine Corps. The driving agent of that needs to be a 
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lateral move into the military contracting field for the remainder of the officer's time in 
service. [Ref. 58] 
Interviews with Mr. Paul Sando who is the head of contracting at the LB Branch 
of HQMC, Ms. Kathy Rogers who is the contracting officer at MCAS Cherry Point, 
North Carolina, and Ms. Alberta Abram who is the contracting officer at MCAS 
Beaufort, South Carolina, reiterated the remarks made by all of the other interviewees 
previously mentioned in this study. They felt that there "absolutely should be a military 
contracting officer billet in [their] office" [Ref. 59]; that "the investment in the schooling 
is so great that [the Marine Corps] should promote and keep the contracting officers" 
[Ref. 60]; that the Marine Corps "shouldn't waste the contracting officers it has, [it] needs 
to retain the knowledge and experience" [Ref. 61]; and that "the killer for the military 
contracting officer community is the fact that it's a secondary MOS, it needs to be a 
primary one" [Ref. 59]. One of the civilian contracting officers even said that "we must 
stop reinventing the wheel each time" and that the turnover "kills [them]". [Ref. 60] 
3. United States Army Contracting Officers 
The officers in the United States Army Acquisition Corps who specialize in 
contracting make the move into the field on a permanent basis. When the researcher 
explained the Marine Corps contracting officer program to an interviewee from the Army 
Acquisition Corps, that officer thought the approach was "ludicrous". He said that he 
might have thought twice about applying for the contracting program if the Army made 
its program just a one-payback tour program like the Marine Corps. He felt that he/the 
Marine Corps officers would not be as competitive for retention and/or promotion when 
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compared to the others in their primary military occupational specialty and that they 
would "undoubtedly loose some of their MOS skill set." He also stated that by creating a 
permanent command structure for the military contracting officers and making the 
transition via a lateral move as a permanent one, that it would "help tremendously in 
building the professionalism within the community." [Ref. 3 7] 
4. Marine Corps Legal Officers 
The legal officers in the Marine Corps often advise military contracting officers 
and help to review contracting documents. After discussing with some of the legal 
officers how the military contracting officer program works in the Marine Corps, one 
stated that it is "kind of a waste of talent and education." He went on to also point out 
that in his experiences and dealings with the military contracting officers that "the people 
who do it are very good at what they do." He also stated that legal officers are "very 
removed from the technical details" of contracting. He also thought that the turnover of 
contracting officers and the fact that there is no stable or permanent contracting officer 
force/command continuously hurts the community. He summarized the interview by 
stating: 
Most people think the NPS guys are thrown a cherry to get to go to school. 
However, they are removed from their primary MOS and taking a chance 
in losing touch with that field. They work their tails off at school 
developing a technical skill and they do a good job. They should be kept 
around. [Ref. 62] 
Another interviewee from the legal officer community also spoke highly of his 
interactions with the military contracting officer community in the Marine Corps. He too 
thought it was a "shame they get pulled after one payback tour" and that the Marine 
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Corps "needs to find a way to keep these guys." He explained to the researcher how the 
legal officer community was structured and employed to provide general legal support 
throughout the Marine Corps. He thought that a similar or parallel structure might be a 
good way to organize a permanent contracting command/force. The legal officers 
basically start out at a base or garrison duty within the various Force Service Support 
Groups. Some are then farmed out to small JAG offices at other commands 
(Divisions/Aircraft Wings). Others are rotated through the MEFs and deploy with the 
MEUs. Then after those experiences, some are sent to higher echelons, like HQMC, to 
provide policy and oversight. He thought that a similar structure might help the 
contracting community to stop "reinventing the wheel each time." [Ref. 63] 
5. DCMA Contracting Officers 
After interviewing various officers within the Defense Contract Management 
Agency, more of the same remarks the researcher heard throughout this study were 
repeated. When the United States Marine Corps military contracting officer program was 
reviewed with the Director of Military Personnel for the Defense Contracting 
Management Agency, he stated: 
I might not have taken a contracting assignment. I would be taken out of 
my field, I would lose touch with it, my networking in it would diminish, 
and I would be hurt for promotion. There are too many significant 
negatives with [the USMC] approach. What benefit does the Marine 
Corps get with removing these guys after three years? 
He also felt that "it would be great" to have Marine Corps contracting officers 
assigned to DCMA and furthermore that "any of [the DCMA] commanders would love to 
have a Marine Corps military contracting officer work for them." A Marine Corps officer 
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at the Defense Contract management Agency would get an "eye opening" experience and 
be "very busy". When he was asked why there are no Marine Corps military contracting 
officers at the Defense Contracting Management Agency, he said that "simply the Marine 
Corps just doesn't send them here." He also stated that: 
The jobs at DCMA for contracting officers are vanilla jobs -meaning no 
special colored suits are required. Any type of service officer could do it 
provided they are qualified contracting officers. A USMC contracting 
officer would do a fine job here, I'm sure. 
Potential jobs for qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers would be as 
program integrators, who are the in-plant eyes and ears of the program manager and 
provide oversight, or as Contract Administrative Officers and/or Quality Assurance 
representatives. [Ref. 64] 
The Defense Contract Management Agency has had a 35% annual increase in its 
workload since 1998. It is broken up into three major commands: DCMA East, DCMA 
West and DCMA International. At a contracting seminar with the Commander of DCMA 
East, he stated that "once General Schwazkopf and General Powell found out what 
DCMA could do in the Gulf War, [DCMA] has been in it ever since." His command 
alone has cognizance over 2,500 contractors and he is convinced the command will 
continue to "right size ourselves and re-organize to best support DCMA's customers." 
To structure his command in order to execute its mission, he has over 69 Contract 
Administrative Offices (CAO) east of the Mississippi River, yet not one Marine Corps 
military contracting officer. When asked about this and if he would be willing to take 
Marine Corps military contracting officers into his command, he enthusiastically stated: 
I would love to have USMC contracting officers at DCMA! They would 
be plenty busy and learn a lot. It would be an asset for the command. The 
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USMC needs more contracting officers and to identify them to DCMA for 
assignment. They could work on USMC exclusive projects and be 
extremely beneficial in that environment. They could also do joint 
projects like the Anthrax vaccine and/or work as program integrators. I 
would be very willing and pleased to have them join the command. [Ref. 
65] 
After a different contracting seminar, the researcher had an opportunity to talk 
with the Chief of Contract Review and Field Assistance for the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). He said that at that particular command they are 
beginning to build their own acquisition staff/organization. He too acknowledged the fact 
that at that joint command there are currently no qualified Marine Corps military 
contracting officers. He did firmly state that they would be willing to employ Marine 
Corps military contracting officers there and that the command could definitely use them. 
He also stated that not only would they "very much so" be gainfully employed but that 
the command would "totally" benefit by having them on staff. His opinion was clear in 
that the Marine Corps military contracting officers would learn a lot and the command 
could positively use the help. [Ref. 66] 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Studies of the service behavior of Marine Officers attending the Special Education 
Program (SEP) have shown that officers who participate in it have been leaving active 
service at a higher rate than non-SEP participating officers. [Ref. 67] The Assistant 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs) echoed this by saying that the 
biggest challenge today is the people problem: not being able to keep good people in the 
organizations and that it's a critical vulnerability. [Ref. 68] As the researcher 
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interviewed officers in the Marine Corps military contracting community, civilian 
Marines in key contracting positions, United States Army Acquisition Corps officers, 
Marine Corps legal officers and DCMA officials, each one generally stated the same 
issues about the Marine Corps military contracting community and its structure: 
• The training and education are superb; 
• There needs to be a move to make the transition into the contracting force a 
permanent one and that a lateral move is the most effective way to do it; 
• The officers, the Marine Corps, and the Defense Contract Management 
Agency would all benefit from assigning Marine Corps military contracting 
officers to DCMA billets; 
• There needs to be a permanent contracting command structure/organization in 
the Marine Corps; 
• Retention of qualified military contracting officers is a problem; 
• There are significant tradeoffs made regarding maintaining knowledge, 
expertise and job skill sets by rotating officers out oftheir primary MOS, into 
a contracting payback tour and back to their primary MOS; and 
• The Marine Corps needs more qualified military contracting officers in its 
ranks. 
As each person was aware of these challenges, actions to rectify these issues are at 
a standstill and have been stalled out for quite some time. With a 25% increase in 
Department of Defense (DOD) procurement projected from now until2005 [Ref. 68], the 
Marine Corps needs to take swift, bold, and decisive action now to be better prepared for 
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the missions of the future. If not, it could find itself scrambling for a quick fix that might 
not be the right or complete answer. The world is changing, different missions are 
evolving more often and the Marine Corps needs to respond accordingly. What can be 
seen most prominently from these interviews is that the people in the field are 
recognizing the need for change. The challenge is finding a viable, long-term solution 
that can be communicated efficiently and effectively to the policy makers, the decision 
makers and the commanders to take action on in order to ensure success today and in the 
future. 
67 
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
68 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes the data collected and material presented in Chapters II and 
III. It covers the strengths, weaknesses, similarities, deficiencies, key elements and 
trends present in the current Marine Corps military contracting officer community. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the course of this study, the researcher has found that one thing is 
constant: the contracting mission of the United States Marine Corps is being 
accomplished. Through identifying and analyzing the strengths, weaknesses, similarities, 
deficiencies, key elements and trends present in the current Marine Corps contracting 
officer community, the objective becomes figuring out how the community can adjust to 
the changing times and missions in such a way to continue to accomplish the mission 
while working smarter not harder. As the Marine Corps prepares for the cloud of 
uncertainty to settle over the volatile world, a proactive approach to change will certainly 
allow for continued superior support from the military contracting community on the 
diverse battlefields. Such adaptability and insight is needed to prepare the contracting 




The Marine Corps has a valid need to sustain its operations in garrison and on the 
battlefield through contracting. By realizing this need and participating in the special 
education program, the Marine Corps sends a handful of officers to the Naval 
Postgraduate School each year to be formally trained and educated in contracting. This is 
a true strength of the military contracting officer community as the officers receive top-
notch education through the grueling and challenging curriculum set up for them at the 
school. Each officer walks away with a solid base, or foundation, in contracting to take 
back with him/her to the Fleet Marine Force. Whereas participation in the special 
education is one hundred percent voluntary, what can be seen is that the Marine Corps 
gets people who want to be there. Accordingly, these officers work diligently through the 
coursework to prepare themselves for their follow-on payback tour in contracting. 
Another strength lies in the fact that the officers who attend the Naval 
Postgraduate School to go through the contracting program are mid-level Captains to 
junior Majors. Officers of those ranks bring with them a wealth of experience from the 
operational forces. This gives them a good understanding of what is happening in the 
trenches at home and overseas to allow them to best support their customers. They 
understand the criticality of contracting high quality items and services to be delivered to 
the right place at the right time. They don't allow themselves to get lost in paper trails 
and they continually present "can do" attitudes. 
The pool of officers that are eligible to participate in the special education 
program and become qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers is not limited 
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to any special field/military occupational specialty. This is a major strength because the 
program utilizes officers with very diverse backgrounds/military occupational specialties. 
It takes on board officers from the combat arms, combat support and combat service 
support communities equally. The result is a contracting force made up of officers with 
military occupational specialties from infantry, artillery and logistics to air traffic 
controllers, supply and aviation. This provides another avenue for the military 
contracting officers to understand and relate to their customers. The contracting officer 
understands the needs of the operational forces and can appreciate the urgency of 
obtaining something to fill that need. 
Every Marine Corps military contracting officer interviewed for this study 
presented a very good attitude towards his/her job. This is often an important strength 
that goes unmentioned. While working in a technically challenging and detail demanding 
profession, each officer was very confident in his/her ability to perform accordingly. 
While not only thoroughly enjoying what they are currently doing in the contracting 
community, each military contracting officer was very adamant in voicing their desires to 
stay in the contracting field and even venture into the Defense Contract Management 
Agency realm if presented the opportunity. Such a feeling of confidence and job 
satisfaction along with flat out liking what they do are very important factors in a formula 
for success. 
With two thirds of the Marine Corps military contracting officer force being in 
place at their jobs for almost two years now, the force is a relatively mature one. This 
presents a strength because there is continuity and experience out there that is surely 
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aiding these officers in doing their job. With the Naval Postgraduate School being a 
choke point for contracting officers prior to returning to the Fleet Marine Force to do 
their payback tour, the officers get to know each other fairly well. The community is 
relatively small and the officers have the ability to reach out to their peers that they went 
through school with to seek advice and assistance. This provides a simplistic way to 
trouble shoot problems and figure out how to be proactive in their professional needs. 
Another strength is the readiness of the current military contracting officer 
community and how it is viewed from outsiders looking in. This can be attributed to the 
maturity of the force as mentioned above. The second portion about the perception of 
outsiders looking in refers to such professions as the legal officers of the Marine Corps. 
There is a portion of business law/contract law that relates the legal officers to the 
contracting officers. The legal officers interviewed for this study had nothing but high 
regards and words of praise when talking about their dealings with Marine Corps military 
contracting officers. They unduly appreciate the hard work, unyielding effort and true 
professionalism that the contracting officers dedicate to their jobs. All of that effort 
upfront makes the legal officer's job easier in the long run. This comes in the form of 
thoroughly drafted contracts, clauses and source selections with such precise detail that 
sufficiently lowers and manages the risk of successful protests. 
The last strength that needs to be mentioned not for the Marine Corps contracting 
community but for the Department of Defense contracting community as a whole is the 
United States Army's approach to training, educating and employing its military 
contracting office community. While the training and education in the beginning is 
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virtually identical to that of a Marine Corps military contracting officer, the focus here is 
on the employment of them. The United States Army approach of putting an officer into 
the contracting community around the rank of mid-level Captain and leaving him/her in 
that community for the remainder of his/her time in the service is brilliant. The officer 
has a path for growth and continuously sharpens his/her contracting skill set by moving 
from one contracting job/billet to another. This ensures continuity in the field, provides 
for a mature force and allows the officers in the field to shape the community with 
whatever changes are needed to best support the war fighters. They are continuously 
improving themselves, their procedures and their policies to provide first-rate support at 
home while in garrison and on the ensuing battlefields. The lack of continual turnover 
allows these officers to build the contracting community's morale and take pride in what 
they do. They learn from their experiences, successes or mistakes, and refine themselves 
over and over again to be the best they can be. The individual contracting officer benefits 
from the permanent assignment as a contracting officer, the contracting community 
benefits from the continued professionalism and innovative changes, and the Army 
benefits by having a highly trained and proficient contracting core. 
C. WEAKNESSES 
Though no weaknesses were found to be catastrophic to the military contracting 
officer community in its ability to complete the mission, there are a couple worth 
mentioning. One such weakness is the acute loss of knowledge/expertise in the officer's 
job field. This works two ways: when leaving his/her primary military occupational 
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specialty to go into contracting; and when leaving the contracting field to go back to 
his/her primary military occupational specialty. 
The five-year stint that an officer does in the contracting community virtually 
removes that officer from his/her primary military occupational specialty. During this 
time, he/she loses touch with that military occupational specialty community and his/her 
skill set declines. With the technology surge at such a continuous high rate today, the 
way things are done constantly changes. This technology directly affects many primary 
military occupational specialties. More and more activities are being automated and if the 
officer is not in the field evolving with these changes, he/she will find that they are out of 
touch with the community. When the officer returns to his/her primary military 
occupational specialty after a five-year hiatus in contracting, he/she will generally be a 
senior Major or junior Lieutenant Colonel. At such a rank the officer would return to the 
Fleet Marine Force to fill a billet like Operations Officer, Executive Officer or even as a 
Commanding Officer of a Battalion or Squadron. To fill one of these billets, the officer 
must be one of the sharpest officers in the unit regarding his/her military occupational 
specialty skills. The problem is that they have not been around within the community for 
the last five years and cannot possibly be accustomed to the changes in policy, practices 
and procedures. This puts that senior officer at a terrible disadvantage and possibly sets 
him/her up for failure. Theoretically, an infantry officer could come back from a payback 
tour in contracting to be an infantry battalion commander. He has to ask himself if he is 
qualified to lead Marines into the front line battle after being away from the community 
for so long. In the case of an officer who is an air traffic controller, is he really qualified 
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to lead a unit in controlling aircrafts after being away from the technology transfusion 
that's taken over the electronics equipment over the last five years? The response from 
the majority of the officers in the contracting community now who will be facing this 
challenge shortly felt that they would not be adequately prepared to do so after their 
payback tour. The researcher agrees with this after reviewing the data collected. 
The other end of the spectrum deals with the fact that the officer spends five years 
developing the skill set needed to be an effective and efficient contracting officer and 
then returns to his/her primary military occupational specialty for a tour. That tour in 
his/her primary military occupational specialty could be three to four years. While 
stepping away from the contracting community for that long, there is no doubt the edge 
and expertise needed to be a proficient contracting officer is lost. Acquisition reform has 
been going on for years and continues to change the way business is done in the 
Department of Defense procurement world. The current way these officers are utilized 
presents a serious weakness in the program. Questions need to be asked about what the 
long-term benefit is of taking the time and spending the money to train and employ these 
officers as contracting officers for that five-year period to virtually never utilize that skill 
set again. To come back to the contracting community as a senior officer after another 
tour in his/her primary military occupational specialty will require more time, training 
and schooling which all amounts to more money. That time and that money is never 
readily available and it presents an unnecessary challenge in bringing that officer back up 
to par to be able to perform the functions of a contracting officer. Had that officer 
remained in contracting since the onset, this would not be an issue. 
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Another weakness in the current design of the Marine Corps military contracting 
officer program is the turnover of billets. Although the maturity of the current military 
contracting officer force was identified as a strength earlier in this study, in a few months 
inexperienced contracting officers right out of school will replace one third of that force. 
As this cycle continues every few years in the program, it presents a spike in the learning 
curve. The research has shown that the new contracting officer spends the entire first 
year in his/her billet learning how to apply the theories learned in school to the real world 
applications. With the majority of the experienced contracting officers getting out of the 
Marine Corps and the others returning to their primary military occupational specialty at 
other locations in the Fleet Marine Force, the new contracting officers are left without 
mentors to help them along the way in understanding and performing their jobs. The 
valuable time being dedicated to teaching themselves their jobs could be used to improve 
the systems, the policies and the procedures while fostering creative innovations from the 
more experienced officers. This is not possible because those experienced contracting 
officers completely leave the community and move on to other non-contracting duties. 
The lack of billets available for Marine Corps military contracting officers is a 
huge weakness for the program. It creates an environment that completely stymies any 
possible growth potential in contracting. The officers fill a role much like a middle 
reliever on a baseball team who comes in to pitch to one batter, gets that batter out and 
hands the ball back over to the manager. The contracting officer comes in for a few 
years, performs the functions of a contracting officer and then leaves the community and 
returns to his primary military occupational specialty. Neither scenario above allows the 
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individual to grow, learn from his/her experiences, mentor new people in the field, 
positively effect the policies at a higher level and refine the procedures using his/her keen 
insight from being around the community for an extended period of time. To compound 
the weakness of not having more billets available for Marine Corps military contracting 
officers is the fact that at some Marine Corps bases and air stations, there are Navy 
officers filling that role. Though they are adequate in getting the job done, there is no 
reason the Marine Corps couldn't put a Marine Corps military contracting officer in any 
of those billets. The same holds true for units that have limited purchasing 
thresholds/constraints and have civilian or senior enlisted Marines filling those roles. 
Those would be outstanding entry-level positions for the inexperienced contracting 
officers coming right out of school. With no billets available at joint commands such as 
the Defense Contract Management Agency, there is also a lack of opportunity for the 
Marine Corps military officers to engage in contracting actions on a larger scale and for 
more diverse items. In any case, all of this limits the amount of exposure the Marine 
Corps military contacting community gets. That is critical, as the commanders need to be 
advised on the vital role that contracting shops perform to support them at home and on 
the battlefield. The weakness is clear: without a good growth pattern in the community, 




One similarity that was discovered in conducting this research was that at some of 
the current billets the reporting chain and general operating procedures were the same. 
This refers to a specific billet on the East coast (i.e. 2"d FSSG contingency contracting 
officer) with an identical billet on the West coast (i.e. P1 FSSG contingency contracting 
officer) where both work for their respective Supply Management Unit (SMU) Officers-
In-Charge (OIC) and approach their tasks in similar manners. That is not the case with 
all of the billets that have mirrored billets on opposite coasts. This similarity allows the 
two officers to share information and knowledge gained through their experiences to 
assist the other in providing superior contracting support. It makes the task of ensuring 
there is no excessive overlapping of responsibility/roles and no areas of responsibility 
overlooked/omitted. By reporting to the same billet in their respective chains of 
command, each can advise the other on what the best approach is gain support and carry 
on the mission. 
The other similarity that stood out in this study was the perception that the current 
Marine Corps military contracting officers had about their primary military occupational 
specialty skill set and expertise. Virtually every officer was concerned about losing 
credibility and experience in his/her primary military occupational specialty. They were 
also concerned about returning to their respective primary military occupational specialty 
two steps behind everyone else as their skill sets deteriorate from being out of the field. 
Add to that the exponential effects the information technology age contributes to the way 
things are done and the researcher believes that these officers have a valid point. 
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Undoubtedly, this diminishing confidence in their primary military occupational specialty 
skill set weighs heavily in their decisions as to either get out of the Marine Corps or go 
back to that field after completing their payback tour in contracting. 
The last similarity that the researcher uncovered while collecting the data was the 
overall attitude of the military contracting officers regarding their desire to remain in the 
contracting field. Virtually all of the current military contracting officers the researcher 
interviewed said they would really like to go from one contracting billet to another for the 
remainder of their time in the service. Accordingly, they felt that the best way to set up 
this type of scenario would be via a military occupational specialty lateral move. The 
researcher feels that this is a superb idea. With a permanent contracting command 
structure in the Marine Corps and other billets created at commands like the United States 
Special Operations Command and the Defense Contract Management Agency, the 
officers would be presented many more opportunities to continue to their employment in 
contracting. There would be a career path, room for growth, a solid base of trained and 
experienced contracting officers, a well developed core ofknowledge and expertise, and a 
wealth of a pool of qualified people to draw on to improve the community. With this 
move to contracting being a voluntary one, the senior leadership would find people who 
truly want to be there applying to it. The result would be greater job satisfaction that 
would in tum trigger more productivity and increased levels of performance. There would 
be a personal commitment by the members of the contracting community to improve how 
the work is done and the policies that govern them to streamline the process and provide 
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continually better customer service. It would be a win-win situation for the officer, the 
Marine Corps and more importantly the customers. 
E. DEFICIENCIES 
The biggest and possibly most detrimental deficiency noted in this study was the 
lack of a clear champion to lead the military contracting officer community into the 21st 
century. There is no senior Marine Corps officer within the contracting ranks that wears 
the uniform, talks the community jargon, and can voice to the senior leadership in the 
Marine Corps what the best course of action is to foster success in such a technical field. 
This person would have working knowledge of what is going on in the field contracting 
billets, how to best support the war fighters, how to refine the policies and procedures, 
and how to structure the community to promote retention and provide superior support. 
Without such a champion, the contracting community has only the few Captains and 
Majors out there in the field getting by with what they have and their peers who have as 
little experience as themselves filling the roles of policy and decision makers at 
Headquarters Marine Corps. It is up to those Captains or Majors filling the handful of 
billets at Headquarters Marine Corps to foster the support needed from officers of much 
senior rank to make the changes and effect how things are done in the contracting 
trenches. The challenge is that they, as junior officers, have to sell what contracting can 
do to support the war fighters as a marketing approach to Colonels and Generals who 
have virtually no experience in the contracting field. For those Colonels and Generals are 
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the ones who can invoke the changes needed to better structure the contracting 
community. 
Another deficiency in the current design of the Marine Corps military contracting 
officer program is the fact that the payback tour is structured as three years performing 
the contracting functions and then they move out of the field. This turnover creates a 
vicious cycle time after time that does not promote the transfusion of the experience 
gained. The program sees officers asking the same questions, making the same mistakes 
and then turning the reigns over to a new and inexperienced contracting officer to reset 
the cycle. With a permanent contracting core, the officers would remain in the 
community while filling various other contracting billets and mentoring the new officers 
towards success from the start. It would create a great bank of knowledge, which any of 
the officers could turn to for help in executing their duties and troubleshooting problems. 
The end result would be a better trained and better prepared core of military contracting 
officers ready to execute any mission at any time. This would steadily increase the 
readiness of not only the contracting community but also the Marine Corps as a whole. 
This is based upon the potential contributions the contracting officers could bring to the 
battlefield to set the war fighters up to be ready to fight with everything they need. 
The inability or unwillingness to recognize contracting as a primary military 
occupational specialty for officers or make the move a permanent one via a lateral move 
really inhibits what the officers can do to make a difference. Because the tour is only 
three years and the first year is being spent learning how to apply the theories learned in 
school, by the time the officers get into a rhythm with their jobs they find themselves 
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turning the billets over to a rookie and they themselves prepare to go back to their 
primary military occupational specialty or terminate their service in the Marine Corps. 
The majority of the military contracting officer billets on the West coast have different 
reporting chains than those on the East coast. There is a sort of disorganized manner of 
determining whom the contracting officer works for, who writes his/her review and who 
provides the needed leadership to him/her. Some report directly to the Commanding 
Generals and some report directly to customers. Reporting to a customer presents the 
possibility of a conflict of interest in executing his/her duties. That is not a good position 
to put a young, inexperienced military contracting officer in. With a refined and formally 
structured new command structure, the military contacting officer would provide services 
for an operational commander and have his fitness report written by a senior contacting 
officer. The report would be based on how well the military contracting officer supported 
that operational commander and that operational commander could provide comments to 
the senior military contracting officer for purposes of the report. Having the operational 
commander write the report with input from the senior military contracting officer, the 
converse of the above, would also work. Either way, how it is structured on one coast 
should be identical to how it is on the other coast. This is how the rest of the Marine 
Corps is organized and it appears to work. 
The last deficiency that needs to be addressed is that there are no billets for 
qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers at the Defense Contract Management 
Agency. All of the other services have billets for military contracting officers at that 
command. The opportunity to serve in a billet there has been expressed as a favorable 
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one by the current Marine Corps contracting officers. The experience and knowledge 
gained would surely benefit the officer, the Defense Contract Management Agency and 
the Marine Corps. The added billets would give the Marine Corps the ability to broaden 
their knowledge in the contracting community. Then the Marine Corps could refine its 
practices and embark on the latest technology and contracting procedures. This would 
also provide the growth opportunities and career progression needed to retain a solid base 
of professional military contracting officers in the Marine Corps. It also allows these 
contracting officers to act as ambassadors of the Marine Corps while serving at the 
Defense Contract Management Agency. Again it presents a win-win situation for all but 
currently this avenue for success and growth doesn't exist. 
F. KEY ELEMENTS 
Because the officers who participate in the Marine Corps military contracting 
officer program do so voluntarily and the fact that there is a selection board to ensure that 
they meet academic and performance standards, the result is a force that is made up of 
high caliber individuals. They are performing a job that they like which not only drives 
up their performance but also gives these officers a great feeling of job satisfaction. 
These officers of such high caliber continually present a "can do" attitude and ensure that 
each task is accomplished thoroughly and in a timely manner. Their ingenuity, 
innovation and work ethic are at the highest levels and the results are shown in the high 
ratings regarding readiness and customer satisfaction. 
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A key element that was identified by the officers the researcher interviewed was 
the idea of Marine Corps military contracting officers having a combat service support 
background. Military occupational specialties such as supply, logistics or financial 
management lend themselves as better backgrounds to have upon embarking on a 
contracting officer assignment. Though not a "show stopper", an officer with a combat 
arms military occupational specialty has to go the extra step in understanding how the 
world of service support works as a whole, the parallel systems it uses and how the focus 
on filling customer needs timely and efficiently takes priority. The difference is changing 
how one thinks: from being a front line executor to a support person who must be 
proactive in reading the plan, seeing the battlefield and determining what will be needed 
to conduct the operation and get the items to the right place at the right time in the right 
quantity to support the right people. Military contracting officers with combat service 
support military occupational specialties are accustomed to thinking like that and have an 
early edge on getting that type of mission done more accurately the first couple of times 
around. Along those same lines, due to the current way the military contracting officer 
program is structured, when it is time to go back to their primary military occupational 
specialties the officers returning to the combat service support field can transition back 
more easily. This is because contracting is a form of combat service support and during 
their contracting payback tour the officers are an ad-hoc part of that field. The officers 
with a primary military occupational specialty of combat arms are judged more harshly 
by their peers and are often looked at as having much less credibility upon returning as 
well. 
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Another key element of this program is having people who are customer oriented 
participate in it. The ability to communicate effectively, understand someone's needs and 
be innovative in filling those needs is of the utmost importance. The military contracting 
officer must work alongside the war fighters who are the customers and be responsive to 
their needs. That officer cannot approach it as an "us versus them" battle or he/she will 
not be successful. By presenting to the war fighters what contracting can bring to the 
battlefield, making their jobs easier or more tolerable, and being acutely responsive in 
filling their needs, the military contracting officer can form a long lasting relationship 
with his/her customers. By being truly customer oriented, the military contracting officer 
can bring timely, effective and efficient support to the customer in garrison or on the 
battlefield. This attention marks superior customer service which will bring those 
customers back every time and keep the military contracting officer fully engaged in 
meaningful tasks to lead the Marine Corps through the 21st century with state of the art 
supplies, services and equipment. 
The most predominant key element uncovered in this study was the fact that 
organizations outside of the Marine Corps have both a need and a desire to employ 
qualified Marine Corps military contracting officers. Throughout various agencies 
external to the Marine Corps like the Defense Contract Management Agency and United 
States Special Operations Command, each was very adamant in saying they would truly 
welcome Marine Corps military contracting officers in their unit, that those officers 
would be gainfully employed and that both the commands and the individuals would 
benefit from such exposure. The Marine Corps would benefit too. The Defense Contract 
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Management Agency has contracting officers from every service except the Marine Corps 
working for them. The Defense Contract Management Agency works on hundreds of 
thousands of contracts annually for programs that are both multi-service and service 
specific. If the Marine Corps made a commitment to dedicate military contracting 
officers to the Defense Contract Management Agency, the officers could work on Marine 
Corps specific programs like the new Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 
trucks and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAA V) or joint programs like the 
anthrax vaccine and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Exposure to these programs for Marine 
Corps military contracting officers, which are currently being administrated by other 
services' officers, would give the programs a Marine Corps perspective that would 
undoubtedly benefit the program. This added dimension through representation would 
also benefit the Marine Corps too. The officer would also benefit by getting the 
experience of working on such major contracts and doing so in a joint service 
environment. The Defense Contract Management Agency would benefit as well by 
having more resources to undertake its mission and have ambassadors from each service 
available to offer insight on specific scenarios. The same holds true for commands like 
the United States Special Operations Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval 
Facilities Command, etc. These units all want to obtain the services of qualified Marine 
Corps military contracting officers but the roadblock to providing this support is the 
Marine Corps' decision to not dedicate the personnel resources to these units. 
Participating in these programs would be a great second tour in contracting for Marine 
Corps military contracting officers. By making some simple organizational design 
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changes to the current system, the Marine Corps could easily identify individuals to fill 
these such billets which in tum would strengthen the Marine Corps contracting 
community by giving it stability and recycling the experience of these qualified officers. 
The officers would continue to experience the job satisfaction they have now and would 
not be so inclined to get out of the Marine Corps by having an opportunity to continue to 
do contracting as a primary military occupational specialty for the remainder of their time 
in service. Participating in the contracting missions of the above mentioned commands 
would create this exact type of option and continue to utilize the skill sets the officers 
develop in contracting as opposed to shelving that knowledge and experience and 
returning them to their primary military occupational specialties after just one three-year 
payback tour in contracting. 
G. TRENDS 
The most alarming trend uncovered in this study is the fact that many of the 
military contracting officers are getting out of the Marine Corps after their payback tours. 
This is occurring at a relatively high rate as shown in the data collected. These officers 
are of a high caliber and provide outstanding support to the Marine Corps' mission. The 
additional time, money and effort spent on training these officers in becoming qualified 
military contracting officers is a significant amount. It would be in the best interest of the 
Marine Corps to do what it takes to retain these officers for continued service. The 
officers interviewed for this study stated that the satisfaction they had for their jobs was 
high and if they could remain in the contracting field they would stay in the Marine 
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Corps. The deterrent or primary reason they stated for getting out of the Marine Corps 
after their payback tour was that they were not going to be afforded the opportunity to 
stay in contracting and do another tour in that field. 
In order to participate in the special education program and the contracting 
discipline, the officers have to have a superior performance record. Assuming these 
officers approach their contracting duties/tour with the same level of effort and achieve 
the same record of performance, their decisions to get out of the Marine Corps after their 
payback tours leave a large void. This void of high performing, exceptionally 
experienced and extensively educated officers takes years to fill. The average rank of the 
officers when they get out after their payback tour is Major/0-4. It takes roughly ten 
years to grow an officer to that rank. In addition to the loss of an officer of that rank and 
quality, the Marine Corps is also losing the experienced leadership that accompanies such 
an officer. That leadership is an integral part in mentoring and developing the younger 
officers as well as the associated troops and noncommissioned officers. In the 
researchers opinion, allowing these officers to get away seriously degrades the Marine 
Corps' capabilities. The officer makes a commitment to provide superior service to the 
Marine Corps in the contracting field. The Marine Corps makes a commitment to ensure 
the officers receive first-rate education and experience in the contracting field. To allow 
those officers to walk away after their payback tour because of the fact that they are not 
afforded the opportunity to continue to work in the contracting field is a shame. The 
Marine Corps needs to take the extra step in changing its organizational design to create a 
permanent contracting command in order to provide this opportunity for its experienced 
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leadership in the contracting field. The end result would be less of a retention problem, 
an increase in individual job satisfaction and a solid core to draw from to provide 
contracting support in garrison and on the battlefields to lead the Marine Corps through 
the 21 51 century. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The acquisition and contracting world of the Department ofDefense is no stranger 
to change. Since as far back as the Revolutionary War period the Department of Defense 
has continued to try to improve the ways in which it conducts its procurement business. 
The pace of change has intensified as of late due to the rapid advances in technology. At 
the macro level, the Department of Defense and the individual military services are trying 
to keep pace with their series of reform initiatives. Unfortunately, in the Marine Corps 
the focus has been on the policies and procedures associated with the acquisition reform 
initiatives. What is being overlooked is how to adjust the structure of its military 
contracting officer personnel to adapt to the changing environment. As the contracting 
mission evolves, the military contracting officers continue to find themselves managing 
the business relationships and processes ofthe Marine Corps not just contracts. These are 
invaluable functions that must be addressed by experienced people to lead the Marine 
Corps through the 21st century. Whereas civilian and enlisted Marines amplify how well 
the contracting mission is executed, the need for a permanent and stable military 
contracting officer force is paramount. Appointing civilian Marines as the head 
contracting officers instead of military contracting officers at so many of the Marine 
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Corps installations and units provides less flexibility. This flexibility being alluded to is 
in work schedules, deploying on ships and over seas, serving on the front lines of the 
battlefields and fighting in conflicts. With a military contracting officer filling these roles 
at the various installations and units, that Marine officer can carry out the contracting 
mission, doesn't need to get paid overtime to work long, arduous hours seven days a 
week, will deploy at a moment's notice on ship or over seas, and will pick up a rifle to 
join the battle and fight. These capabilities are not lost by creating a permanent 
contracting command that is staffed with military contracting officers. It is a "two for 
one" deal as every Marine is a rifleman; these ones are just advanced in conducting 
contracting actions as well. The civilian and enlisted Marines will still be there to 
support as well, but now there is much more flexibility in accomplishing the various 
assigned missions. The Marine Corps also benefits by retaining that experienced and 
somewhat senior leadership to help steer the Marine Corps along the way. 
The strengths, weaknesses, similarities, deficiencies, key elements and trends of 
the current organizational design for the military contracting officer program are many. 
This chapter highlighted some of the more important ones. With a few simple changes, 
the Marine Corps can secure a stable base of qualified and experienced military 
contracting officers to draw from to support its mission. Change requires effort and an 
ability to see where the particular service wants to be in the future. The Marine Corps 
needs to understand that future position or vision and begin to restructure its contracting 
organization now so it will be prepared for the future challenges. The right amount of 
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effort up front will not only leave the Marine Corps better prepared for what the future 
holds but it will also produce less unintended consequences from a lack of adaptability. 
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V. MODEL FOR A PERMANENT CONTRACTING COMMAND 
STRUCTURE 
There are many ways to run an organization successfully. As mentioned earlier in 
this study, the contracting mission of the Marine Corps is being accomplished. A lot of 
time, effort and money are being used to produce that desired end state. In the context of 
the current design of the Marine Corps military contracting officer program, there are 
unintended outcomes prevailing that detract from the success of the program. The 
perceived loss of occupational specialty skill sets, the lack of growth and adequate 
stability in the contracting force, and the retention of the highly educated and technically 
skilled officers stand as the three most predominate ones. In an effort to combat these 
unintended outcomes, the researcher will introduce a model of a permanent contracting 
command structure for the Marine Corps in this chapter. 
A. NARRATIVE OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
In order to understand the rationale behind the model of a permanent contracting 
command structure for the Marine Corps that will be introduced later in this chapter, the 
researcher believes it is appropriate to discuss how an organizational systems framework 
applies to the contracting community. 
In a general sense, an organization has inputs that directly contribute to 
throughputs that in turn produce results. A visual representation of this relationship can 
be seen in Figure 5.1 below: 
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Inputs------. Throughputs------. Results 
t + I 
Feedback Feedback 
Figure 5.1 Organizational Systems Framework From Ref. [69) 
The three general categories of inputs, throughputs and results can be broken 
down even further. Inputs come in the forms of an environment, key success factors and 
systems direction. Throughputs take the forms of tasks/jobs, technology, structure, 
people and processes/subsystems. As the organizational design moves towards results, 
those results appear as cultures, outputs and outcomes. Accordingly, feedback from the 
results to the throughputs and/or inputs identifies strengths and/or weaknesses and allows 
the system to be modified to adjust properly and correct any weaknesses or deficiencies. 
Generally speaking, the majority of the time the feedback will trigger changes to be made 
in the design factors of the throughputs to reduce the outcomes and increase the outputs. 
The outputs are the products or services the system was attempting to provide/produce, 
while outcomes are generally unintended consequences or implications that arrive as a 
result of the system. A visual representation of this relationship can be seen in more 


















Figure 5.2 Detail Relationship of Organizational Systems Framework From Ref. 169) 
Culture Outputs Outcomes 
f--. ~ 
Feedback 
When discussing the inputs, as mentioned earlier, the organizational systems 
framework refers to the environment, key success factors and system direction as seen 
above. The environment is external to the system and addresses political, economical, 
social and technological issues. These come in forms of rules, regulations, competition, 
laws, etc. The key success factors identify what it takes for the system to be successful. 
The system direction covers mandates, values, missions, strategic issues, visions, goals 
and strategies. All of this can been seen in the Marine Corps military contracting officer 
program's design in the form of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, Department of 
Defense procurement policies, Marine Corps contracting mission, socioeconomic goals, 
competition requirements, and strategic mission according to the National Military 
Strategy. 
The five design factors mentioned earlier and shown above, are the points where 
change can be introduced to adjust the organizational systems framework in order to 
achieve the desired outputs. The tasks/jobs area identifies: what the basic tasks are; how 
they are formalized; what specification is required; how it is varied; and what 
differentiation is required. For the military contracting officer program in the Marine 
Corps, this means outlining the need for officers who are specifically qualified and 
educated in contracting, what their job descriptions are and what the job requirements are 
to carry out the assigned missions. Under the technology area of the design factors are 
issues such as: describing the work flow; identifying the activities in the work flow; 
identifying the key interdependencies among units or activities in the work flow; and 
identifying the physical condition of the facilities and equipment. Under the current 
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design of the military contracting officer organization in the Marine Corps this would 
cover standard operating procedures in garrison or while on a contingency contracting 
assignment, doing the job manually with all of the required forms, turning to a paperless 
contracting plan with the use of current automation, pooled interdependencies with 
assistance from the legal officers, etc. The processes/subsystems area of the design 
factors highlights four main areas in it. These areas are: financial management, 
measurement and controls; communication/information planning and decision making; 
acquisition and contracting; and human resource management. Financial management, 
measurement and controls identifies: how people are held accountable for resources; 
what the budgeting, control, performance measurement and appraisal processes are; and if 
these mechanisms of accountability produce the desired patterns of behavior. In the 
contracting design today, this is covered by issuing warrants that give the officers the 
authority to enter into contracts up to the specified amount on their warrants and through 
coordination with programmers and controllers to ensure the funds are authorized, 
appropriated and allocated correctly. The communication/information planning and 
decision making maps out: how the organization communicates; how it gathers, 
processes, distributes and evaluates information; how it plans; and how it makes 
decisions. This can be seen in the military contracting officer community by the ways in 
which it communicates with its customers to gain a sense of their needs, how the officers 
solicit suppliers, how they work with their staffs to administer their contracts continually 
and maximize the use of electronic communications. The acquisition and contracting 
portion of the processes/subsystems area specifically addresses how the acquisition 
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process is managed. The relation to the design of the military contracting officer 
organization today is that the contracting officer has to be, and generally is, in the 
planning cycle from the start. Otherwise the program might run into unforeseen 
challenges as the military contracting officer is often the business relationship manager to 
the civilian contractors. It also addresses the preparedness to rapidly deploy and perform 
the contingency contracting mission as it becomes needed. Regarding the human 
resource management area under the processes/subsystems design factor, it addresses: 
how people are recruited, selected, retained, rotated, promoted, terminated and retired; if 
the organization has the right kind of people it needs; how to train and develop the people 
and if the current efforts are adequate; and what the rewards, compensation and awards 
are for performance. All of these issues are extremely relevant to the way the current 
design of the military contracting officer organization is and will be addressed in more 
detail later on in this chapter. The people area of the design factors identifies who the 
people are in the organization and what their motives, expectations and mindsets are. It 
also touches on what their knowledge, skills and abilities are. Under the current design, 
the military contracting organization clearly identifies the individual officers who are 
selected to become qualified contracting officers. Each officer's prior performance in the 
Fleet Marine Force is outstanding hence their selection to the program. They are all 
presented the material to begin creating their "contracting tool box" with the knowledge, 
skills and abilities needed to be a contracting officer through the schooling and training. 
The last area of the design factors, structure, describes: how the organization is 
structured; what the basic groupings of activities and people are; how the activities/tasks 
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are combined or departmentalized; how the groupings are integrated; and what the 
organization's hierarchy is. All of the data collected and material presented throughout 
this study has outlined the current structure as a design factor for the military contracting 
officer community today. Specifically, it shows a non-routine chain of command, a lack 
of coordination, weak controls and virtually no pooled interdependence in execution. 
Along with the human resource issue, the structure design factor will be focused on in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
As the organization gradually moves from throughputs to results, the first stop in 
the transition is culture. The culture in an organization identifies: the prevalent norms 
and values in the system as they are expressed in behavior; how conflict is managed; 
what the informal patterns of interaction are; if there are any sub-cultures; if the culture 
impedes or facilitates integration of effort; and if the culture fits the larger environment. 
The culture represented by the current organizational design of the military contracting 
officer structure is a positive one. The officers show a norm of doing what it takes to get 
the job done efficiently and effectively while promoting values of honor, integrity and 
pride in their workmanship. They manage conflicts by addressing concerns upfront with 
their customers and maintaining competition amongst their suppliers. The informal 
patterns of interaction and sub-cultures that arise come in the form of relationships that 
the officers create at the beginning of their contracting training. While at the Naval 
Postgraduate School the officers form a sort of bond that allows each one to feel 
comfortable in calling on their peers later in their payback tour for advice and 
recommendations. Without a doubt, the culture created fits the larger environment 
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whereas the military contracting officers and their offices work diligently in supporting 
the war fighters. They understand the importance of their positions and ensure that any 
mission is accomplished regardless of what roadblocks or challenges present themselves 
along the way. 
The full transition from throughputs to results finds the organizational systems 
framework ending up with outputs and outcomes. The outputs are what the system offers 
or produces in terms of goods/services. It also addresses how outputs are measured and 
what the indicators of performance are. In the military contracting officer organization, 
clearly the system offers outputs in terms of the goods and services that are contracted 
for. Both the number of contract actions and the dollar values of the contracts 
administered measure these outputs. The indicators of performance are shown in the fact 
that the war fighters are getting the goods, services and equipment they need in a timely 
manner. If they were not, then a change would need to be initiated somewhere within the 
design factors to revamp the contracting process. Currently, customer satisfaction and 
readiness are both relatively high so the deduction to be made is that performance is 
being adequately executed and indicated. The last result is in the form of outcomes. 
These are unforeseen or unintended consequences. Outcomes identify what the 
implications/consequences of the outputs for the stakeholders are and how the outputs are 
viewed in terms of the environment. Outcomes are what invoke the need to introduce 
change somewhere within the organizational system design. The outcomes that prevail in 
the current design of the Marine Corps military contracting officer organization are: low 
retention/contracting officers getting out of the Marine Corps; a perceived loss of 
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credibility and expertise in occupational specialties; and no ability for growth and follow 
on tours in the contracting field. The feedback of these outcomes now returns to the 
design factors to initiate change. 
The researcher believes that the two areas that should be targeted for the changes 
needed to reduce these outcomes, or that would eliminate them entirely, are in the 
structure and human resource management areas. It is these two design factors that will 
impact the results portion of the organizational systems framework most significantly for 
the military contracting officer program. In regards to the human resource management 
area of the design factors, there is already a good beginning in place. The current way of 
recruiting, selecting and training the individual officers is superb. The continued 
development, growth and retention of the military contracting officers is what comes up 
short in allowing this design factor to have as much of a positive impact as it could. 
Because the life span of a military contracting officer is really just one three-year payback 
tour and there is currently such a small amount ofbillets available, the officers don't get 
the opportunities to continually develop their skills and grow professionally in the field. 
As such, retention becomes a problem because the officers want to continue doing 
contracting but opt to get out of the Marine Corps instead. The type of change needed in 
this design factor must focus its efforts on development, growth and retention. The 
design factor that addresses the structure of the organization does not optimize the current 
assets and resources. The non-routine chain of command, lack of coordination and 
absence of any truly pooled interdependence within the contracting community become 
the targets for change in this area. By crafting a change that makes the community better 
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organized, allows the move to contracting to become a new primary military occupational 
specialty and adequately staffing billets at contracting agencies external to the Marine 
Corps will allow the program to optimize its resources and increase its outputs for a more 
complete desired end state. The next section of this study seeks to restructure the current 
organization in order to strengthen the program and correct these deficiencies. The 
researcher does this by introducing a model for a new contracting command structure that 
is a permanent part of the Marine Corps. 
B. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
To promote the continued development, growth and retention of the military 
contracting officers, increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Marine Corps 
contracting community, and provide flexibility in supporting the war fighters and lead the 
Marine Corps through the 2P' century, the researcher offers the model in Figure 5.3 
below as a design for a permanent contracting command structure that falls under the 
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Figure 5.4 Breakout of the Joint, Multi-Service and Reserve Contracting Portion of the Model [Source: Developed by 
Researcher) 
This model maps out how a new permanent contracting command structure could 
be constructed and integrated into the Marine Corps. Implementing this would in effect 
be the be the type of change needed for the design factors of the basic organizational 
systems framework model to positively impact the military contracting .officer 
community in the Marine Corps. It would be the perfect anti-venom to combat the 
outcomes that the current systems design produces. While only the Western Regional 
Contracting Command was expanded in Figure 5.3, similar structures apply for the other 
identical commands. For example, the Eastern Regional Contracting Command and 
Asian Regional Contracting Command would have subordinate commands like II MEF 
and III MEF, respectively. The Contracting Plans, Policies and Oversight Command 
would have a smaller portion of sub-elements whereas it would focus on exactly what the 
title reflects: plans, policies and oversight for the entire Marine Corps Contracting 
community. They would focus on rewriting/reviewing orders, regulations, new contract 
initiatives, etc. This proposed model creates a multitude of more military contracting 
officer billets and employs a lateral move process as the vehicle to begin staffing the 
outlying billets. This model also provides opportunities for the continued development 
and growth of the military contracting officers that should in tum boost retention. Now 
the officers have a career path and an opportunity to continue to use their contracting skill 
sets by rotating throughout the different military contracting officer billets. 
The model works by taking the inexperienced contracting officers who come right 
out of the Naval Postgraduate School and employ them in the lower tier contracting 
billets. That would give them some experience in the field of contracting and allow them 
105 
to learn the differences between the theories learned in school and applications in the 
Fleet Marine Force. These billets would be contracting officers at the Marine 
Expeditionary Units (MEU), the Marine Corps Bases and Air Stations, and Force Service 
Support Group contingency contracting offices, etc. After spending a tour performing the 
functions of contracting in units like the above mentioned commands the officers would 
be rotated to a second contracting tour. This proposed second tour would be in a billet 
that requires some prior experience in contracting. Those billets would be as contracting 
officers with the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), as Executive Officers (XO) or 
Assistant Officers-in-Charge (OIC) at a major contracting command, as a contracting 
policy officer, or as a Defense Contract Management Agency (or other joint/multi-service 
unit) contracting officer. After that second tour in contracting, the officers' third tour in 
contracting would be as a Commanding Officer of a major contracting command, as an 
Executive Officer of a regional contracting command, as the head of contracting for the 
systems contracting command, or as a theatre contracting commander. As the officer 
progresses through each of these tours, he/she would be gaining valuable experience and 
insight of the Marine Corps contracting world and become not only a leader but also a 
mentor, teacher and advisor for junior officers in contracting. It builds stability for the 
contracting community and allows the people who have "been there, done that" in Marine 
Corps contracting to work on, dictate and update the policies and procedures that govern 
the community. It also allows the officers to remain in contracting for upwards of ten 
years to round out their time in service with the Marine Corps. Such opportunities would 
encourage more officers to stay in the service and erase any problems with retention. 
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Obviously as the officers work up the pyramid in terms of years in service and rank, there 
become fewer and fewer billets available. After the twenty-year mark in time in service 
there are only a few Colonel/0-6 billets in this model and only one that is for a Brigadier 
General/0-7. If implemented, this model would need to be continually refined and 
through experience in the community other options for more such senior officer billets 
might present themselves. 
To make this model work, the military occupational specialty of contracting 
would have to become a primary one for officers. This follows in suit with the way the 
United States Army does it. What the Marine Corps could do is basically make the 
transition to contracting be a lateral move that is initiated when the officer applies and is 
accepted to go to the Naval Postgraduate School. The schooling presents the background 
and education needed to train the officers to become contracting officers much like any of 
the other formal military occupational specialty schools do in the Marine Corps. Lastly, 
the model does not depict how the civilian and enlisted Marines fit in the scheme of this 
new permanent contracting command structure. They are a very important component 
and cannot be overlooked. As mentioned in the beginning of this study, that would be a 
complete study entirely on its own. The assumption is that the necessary complement of 
civilian and enlisted Marines would be present at each of the commands shown in the 
model. They would fill billets like deputies, chiefs, specialists, clerks, etc. 
A solid team of contracting officers for the Marine Corps as promoted in this 
model would benefit the Marine Corps as a whole and the officers individually. The 
Marine Corps would retain the services of these highly trained professionals while the 
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officers would continue to grow and serve in a challenging area that they enjoy. Other 
agencies/commands like the Defense Contract Management Agency would also benefit 
by receiving additional resources in the form of dedicated contracting officers to continue 
their missions. It is a win-win situation for everyone. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter started out by identifying an organizational systems framework basic 
model. It then went into more detail of how it is broken down even further and went into 
what each element represents. From there it applied the current Marine Corps military 
contracting officer community's design structure to that model and identified the outputs 
and outcomes. Through addressing the outputs (unintended consequences) and 
implementing changes back into the design factors, a new model was introduced. The 
new model designed a permanent contracting command structure for the Marine Corps. 
Implementing this model would decrease or almost entirely eliminate the undesirable 
outcomes and allow the contracting community to help lead the Marine Corps through the 
21st century. Change is inevitable and planning for it early is a key success factor. This 
change, in the form of the newly proposed model, is relatively simple and can pay big 
dividends in the end. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study has covered the history of change in the Department of Defense 
contracting world, how the Marine Corps military contracting officer program works, 
what the officers currently in the contracting community feel are important issues from an 
insiders standpoint, and proposed a model for a permanent contracting command in the 
Marine Corps. The researcher has shown that the success of the Marine Corps military 
contracting officer program can be attributed to the formula of skills plus desire equals 
product. The officers are calling for a change and as the stakeholders they will tend to 
buy into any proposed changes when they are a part of the decision and party to the 
process. Top-level support is an essential element for such a design change. This chapter 
presents conclusions and recommendations for the study that was conducted. It also 
answers the research questions that were introduced in chapter I, recommends areas for 
future research, and summarizes the need for change. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The data collected and material presented throughout this study have enabled the 
researcher to reach the following conclusions: 
1. There is a retention problem in the Marine Corps military contracting officer 
community. The officers are highly educated, technically skilled and enjoy 
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what they are doing as military contracting officers. As it draws closer to the 
end of their obligated service time, or payback tour, many of the current 
military contracting officers have said that they will get out of the Marine 
Corps vice go back to their primary military occupational specialty. Though 
many did state that if they could stay in the contracting field for the remainder 
of their time in service that they would stay in the Marine Corps. A lot of 
time, money and effort go into training and educating these officers. The 
Marine Corps needs to make the necessary changes in its structure and policy 
that will make it more attractive to the officers in order to retain them. Many 
companies have realized the value of retaining the right personnel and 
achieving workforce stability. Some even say that resignations cost an 
estimated 25%-200% above that person's annual salary and others say it is 
even as high as seven times as much. The Marine Corps needs to realize this 
and take proactive steps to keep its core of contracting experts. By not doing 
so, almost one third of the duty experts rotate out of the military contracting 
officer billets annually. One study has shown that many companies reproduce 
their blunders on a regular basis and waste time and resources resolving 
problems that have previously been unraveled in the company. It also states 
that reinventing the wheel is a much more common drain of corporate 
resources and creativity then most managers imagine. [Ref. 70:P. 150] The 
key for the Marine Corps is to learn from other companies' mistakes, embrace 
change and retain its core of contracting experts. 
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2. There is a perceived loss of occupational specialty skill sets by the military 
contracting officers. This perception is regarding their primary military 
occupational specialty skill sets and their secondary (contracting) military 
occupational specialty skill sets. Most of the officers interviewed for this 
study stated that they felt they would not be as proficient in their primary 
military occupational specialty after returning to that field from their five year 
stint in contracting (two years of school and three years of a payback tour). 
They were also concerned that it might hurt them in terms of future billet 
opportunities and promotion possibilities. On the other side of the issue, 
many felt that after returning to their primary military occupational specialty 
for three to four years that they would loose their proficiency in contracting. 
The problem being that they would not be current with acquisition reform 
initiative's, policies and procedures. The research has shown that each case is 
highly likely. 
3. The current organizational design of the military contracting officer 
community permits only limited growth and development opportunities for 
the officers. There are so few billets for military contracting officers in the 
Marine Corps right now. Additionally, there are also no billets for Marine 
Corps military contacting officers at joint or multi-service commands like the 
Defense Contract Management Agency or United States Special Operations 
Command. The officers do their three year payback tour in contracting and 
then leave the community. There is little time to learn from their experiences 
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and make much of a positive impact on the policies and procedures that 
govern the community. Opportunities for growth and development will 
provide stability and continuity while aiding retention. Having experienced 
officers lead the technical community of contracting would benefit it 
significantly. 
4. The proposed model for a permanent contracting command in the Marine 
Corps will greatly enhance the capabilities of the military contracting officer 
community. It addresses the outcomes of the current organizational design 
and makes appropriate changes to reduce those outcomes. The model also 
shows that the Marine Corps will benefit as will the individual officers. It 
presents a proactive approach to change that will enable the contracting 
community to better support the operational forces through the 2P1 century. 
The design allows the officers to retain the skills of being a war fighter while 
also allowing them to be the duty experts in contracting for an extended period 
of time. This encourages the military contracting officers to tailor the 
processes involved in contracting and streamline how things are done through 
the experience they gain in the field. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From analyzing the data collected and material presented throughout this study, 
the researcher makes the following recommendations: 
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1. Implement the proposed model and create a permanent contracting command 
in the Marine Corps. Doing so will reduce the outcomes of the current 
military contracting officer program's organizational design. It will create a 
path for growth, development and career progression for the military 
contracting officers in the Marine Corps. The design structure for the new 
command allows the officers to rotate from one contracting billet to another. 
This will enable the officers to continually refine their contracting skill sets 
and also work to boost retention amongst them. The model proves to be a 
benefit to the individual officers and the Marine Corps as a whole. It builds 
on the contracting community's core competencies and utilizes individuals 
with field contracting experience to become policy makers and mentors to the 
younger and less experienced military contracting officers. 
2. Make the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of contracting a primary 
MOS for officers in the Marine Corps. This is already being done for the 
enlisted Marines. To accomplish this, the transition to the new MOS of 
contracting should be a lateral move that is initiated when applying for the 
special education program. The officers should be assigned the contracting 
MOS as a primary one after successful completion of schooling at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. From that point on, roughly as a mid-level Captain in 
· rank, the officers should be rotated amongst contracting billets that will enable 
them to utilize their special skills and experiences in contracting. The 
commitment oftime and money to send the officers to the Naval Postgraduate 
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School is a big one. The Marine Corps should look to optimize those efforts 
by continually employing the officers in the field in which they are trained. 
This correlates to the way the United States Army trains and employs its 
contracting officers. It promotes a stable core of well trained contracting 
officers who are ready to carry out the myriad of contracting assignments in 
garrison and in battle. By making contacting a primary military occupational 
specialty at the rank of mid-level Captain, it offers the officers the opportunity 
to remain in a field that is not only mission essential and technically 
challenging, but rewarding and enjoyable to them. The deduction to be made 
here is that if the officers like what they are doing then they will want to 
remain doing it and do it well. This will promote retention and provide the 
means for which the Marine Corps can obtain first rate service support from 
the contracting field. 
3. The Marine Corps should aggressively create and staff military contracting 
officer billets at commands external to the Marine Corps. This means at joint 
and multi-service commands (such as the Defense Contract Management 
Agency, the United States Special Operations Command and other like units) 
that the Marine Corps dedicate personnel resources in the form of qualified 
military contracting officers to fill contracting officer billets at those 
commands. This will aid the external commands by not only having 
additional resources to execute their missions, but also have ambassadors from 
the Marine Corps present to add a Marine Corps perspective in the hundreds 
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of programs they have. The Marine Corps will benefit from the exposure as 
the officers gain invaluable experience from working with the other services 
and on such a wide array of contracts. From working on large programs like 
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to administering contractor logistics support 
contracts, the Marine Corps military contracting officers would see things they 
wouldn't in an all Marine environment and be able to take that knowledge and 
experience back to the Marine Corps. This would enable the Marine Corps to 
refine its policies, procedures and practices to ensure it is using the latest 
technologies and in concert with current acquisition reform initiatives. It is a 
win-win situation for all. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
This study sought to answer the five secondary questions presented in chapter I in 
order to find a complete answer to the primary research question of how the Marine 
Corps could restructure its military contracting officer force to be better prepared to meet 
today's needs and be more effective in supporting the operational forces. All of the data, 
analyses, conclusions and recommendations throughout this study have answered those 
questions. The model presented in chapter V tied it all together by mapping out a new 
organizational design for the military contracting officer force that, if implemented, 
would increase its effectiveness and efficiency, promote growth and development, 
provide stability, and boost retention amongst the contracting officers. 
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This study has examined where billets exist for Marine Corps military contracting 
officers and where billets are currently non-existent in the Marine Corps and other 
commands. It determined that more billets should be created at the systems command, 
bases, air stations and external agencies that would benefit the units and the individuals. 
These billets are appropriately depicted in the model in Chapter V. 
The current roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps military contracting 
officers at each command were presented in Chapters II and III. The study evaluated the 
billets from a historical point and by discussing the details given by the officers currently 
filling many of them. It proved the mission was valid, the need is high for more billets 
and that the current method for training the officers was superb. The employment of 
them was effective too, but the new structure proposed in the model would increase the 
effectiveness of the positions. 
In assessing how the Marine Corps supports the Defense Contract Management 
Agency with qualified military contracting officers, it was determined that currently the 
Marine Corps is the only service that does not provide any contracting officers to fill 
billets at that command. Through use of the proposed model, this study has shown 
'where/how to implement billets that would benefit both the Defense Contract 
Management Agency and the Marine Corps. 
One of the other secondary research questions sought to find out if the Marine 
Corps could learn from the Army in its effective and efficient training and employment of 
its military contracting officers. The Army permanently assigns officers to the 
contracting profession at around the rank of mid-level Captain. Once a qualified military 
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contracting officer, the officer stays in the contracting profession for the remainder of 
his/her time in service. This promotes growth, development and career progression. It 
also builds a nucleus of experts to shape the community and solidifies its core 
competencies. The Marine Corps would reap the same benefits by allowing its officers to 
laterally move into the contracting field and progress as presented in the proposed model. 
The last research question inquired about what organizational changes could be 
made to the Marine Corps to continually provide for well trained contracting officers that 
are mission effective and what the resulting career field path would be. Chapter V covers 
this in detail by introducing the basic organizational systems framework as it applies to 
the Marine Corps military contracting officer community and prompting changes that 
would enable the force to continue to be proficient. The resulting model also mapped out 
a career progression that would boost retention and enhance the capabilities of the 
community. 
The proposed model really answers all of the research questions posed in Chapter 
I. The key to the future success of the program is being open to change. The officers in 
the field have identified it and seek the senior leaders to act on it. This will ensure 
superior service support is continued throughout the 21st century. 
E. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Four areas for future research are recommended after concluding this study. They 
are as follows: 
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1. Perform a cost/benefit analysis to quantify the implementation of the proposed 
model. This would provide hard numbers showing what it would cost the 
Marine Corps to create the billets proposed, while also showing exactly what 
the benefits would be of such billets above and beyond what was projected in 
this study. 
2. Create a manpower plan to implement the proposed model. To create as many 
billets as proposed in this study's model, a well developed plan on how to 
recruit enough officers without draining the other occupational specialties will 
have to be done. One option might be to phase them in over time. 
3. Conduct a future study of customer service after implementation of the model 
proposed in this study. By comparing customer service before and after the 
implementation of the proposed model from this study, the Marine Corps 
could see the additional benefits gained from it that were not addressed in 
detail in this study. It would also serve as a way to validate the model in order 
to adjust the proposed billets as necessary. 
4. Perform a similar study to the one done here as it applies to the civilian and 
enlisted Marines in the contracting community. This would ensure that all 
contracting offices are staffed with the right complement of civilian and 
enlisted Marines to round out the Marine Corps contracting teams. They 




Change is an everyday part of life. All around the world, change occurs regularly. 
The department of Defense is acknowledging this change in the different littorals, 
missions and operations it has been participating in over the last decade. Also changing 
is the business operations side of the Department of Defense. As it strives to do things 
better, faster and cheaper, the Department of Defense is making changes in its policies 
and procedures that govern the acquisition and contracting community. The concept of 
centralized policy and decentralized execution sees some services being more successful 
then others at reading the winds of change and moving forward. The Marine Corps 
military contracting officer community is a relatively young one as it has only been 
around since 1991. It has not endured much change since the way it was originally 
organized. This study looked at the current organizational design of the military 
contracting officer community and developed a model that would promote the change 
needed to keep the community as an invaluable asset to the Marine Corps. Those 
military contracting officers are the ones that manage the business relationships for the 
Marine Corps and bring the support to the battlefield that the war fighters need. The 
Marine Corps cannot afford to let politics override good business sense. It must be 
proactive in making the changes necessary for the growth and development that the 
community needs so that the Marine Corps can retain the highly educated and technically 
skilled officers it has in the contracting community. As stated throughout this study, the 
contracting mission of the Marine Corps is being accomplished today. How well it is 
accomplished in the years to come will depend on how well the program adjusts to its 
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rapidly changing environment. There are many ways to run an organization successfully. 
This study has mapped out a viable way to maximize the training, education and potential 
of Marine Corps military contracting officers in order to be better prepared to support the 
operational forces through the 21st century. 
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